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Educators Who Drive With No Hands: 
The Application of Analytical Concepts 
of Corporate Law in Certain Cases of 
Educational Malpractice 
CHERYL L. WADE* 
PROLOGUE 
The national debate concerning the inadequacies of public schools in 
the United States and ways to alleviate some of the problems that plague 
them continues to rage.1 The performance of children in the United 
States on standardized tests is dangerously poor,2 and the rate of 
* Associate 'Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law; B.A., State 
University of New York at Stony Brook; M.A., St. John's University; J.D., Hofstra 
University School of Law. 
I am grateful to my colleagues Vice Dean M. Patricia Adamski, Professors John 
DeWitt Gregory, Vern R. Walker, Wendy M. Rogovin, and Robin Charlow for helpful 
comments on prior drafts of this Article. I thank Professor Alan N. Resnick for 
assistance and advice that preceded this undertaking. I am especially grateful to 
Professors Twila L. Perry and Regina Austin and the members of the Northeast Corridor 
for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts. My thanks go as well to Jonathan 
Ettricks, Alexander Sepulveda, and Linda Kevins for excellent research assistance. 
1. See Lewis D. Solomon, The Role of For-Profit Corporations in Revitalizing 
Public Education: A Legal and Policy Analysis, 24 U. TOL. L. REV. 883 (1993). 
"Public school reform has been a 'catch phrase' for a decade .... Numerous reports and 
analyses conducted during the past decade all point to one sorry conclusion: our schools 
are not doing their job." Id. at 886. 
2. See Michael Briggs, Report Finds No Letup in Big-City School Problems, CHI.
SUN-TIMES, Sept. 27, 1994, at 22. "In recent years, American thirteen-year olds have 
scored thirteenth out of the fifteen industrialized nations on international tests in the 
437 
illiteracy dangerously high.3 An alarmingly large number of students 
do not finish high school.4 Education is often compromised because of 
crowded classrooms5 and shortages in school personnel6 and text-
books. 7 Part of the debate about the problems in public education 
involves the search for someone or something to blame. While societal 
problems contribute to the failure of some public schools, 8 the harm 
caused by inadequate teachers must not be ignored. Some participants 
in the debate recognize that the improvement of public education 
depends on improving the quality of teaching itself.9 
Most of the participants in the discourse about education recognize 
the importance of an adequate education. In addition to the harm 
suffered by a poorly educated individual, it is costly and dangerous for 
society to allow large numbers of its citizens to remain uneducated.10 
For example, most prison inmates are high school dropouts, and the 
expense of their incarceration drains societal resources. 11 Moreover, 
areas of math and science." Solomon, supra note 1, at 886. 
3. "Thirteen percent of America's seventeen-year olds are illiterate . 
Solomon, supra note 1, at 887. 
4. "One in five students does not finish high school." Id. at 887-88. In Chicago, 
there is a 45 percent dropout rate in the public high schools. Briggs, supra note 2. 
5. See Richard Cowen, Japanese Educators Visit Paterson, Tour Schools Seeking 
Cures/or Crowding, THE RECORD, Sept. 24, 1994, at A04. 
6. Adults Call Crime Top School Woe Despite Dip in Rate, Poll Says, COM. 
APPEAL (Memphis), Aug. 26, 1994, at 4A. 
7. See, e.g., Joan Little, Schools Rewrite the Book on Texts; City District Touts 
Distribution Plan, ST. Loms POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 19, 1994, at 12A. 
8. Substance abuse, gang membership, teenage pregnancy, and low-income and 
single-parent households are some of the issues facing public schools and their students. 
See Romel Hernandez, Should Schools Take on Role of Parents? 7 Denver Facilities 
Take Mom and Dad Along with the Kids in Expensive Education Experiment, ROCKY 
MTN. NEWS, Sept. 25, 1994, at 24A (describing "family resource schools" that confront 
social problems by offering day care and classes in parenting and family nutrition for 
students and their parents). Violence, teenage suicide, and homelessness are additional 
social problems the 1994 National Teacher of the Year says cannot be resolved by 
educators alone; she believes only community involvement can mitigate such problems. 
See Jon Glass, "I'm Not Letting the Community Off the Hook, " Top Teacher Says; 
Educators are Asked to Solve Problems That are Rooted in All of Society, She Says, 
VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Norfolk), Sept. 22, 1994, at B3. 
9. Class Action, Boston GLOBE, Sept. 6, 1994, at 10. 
10. But see CHARLES MURRAY & RICHARD HERRNSTEIN, THE BELL CURVE 
(1994). Murray and Herrnstein maintain that improvement in education may not provide 
corresponding benefits for African-Americans, for example, because under their view, 
African-Americans are genetically less intelligent. The authors' position is particularly 
dangerous because they advocate that social services be distributed according to whether 
such services will actually improve the lives of the recipients. Under this view, there 
may be no need to improve the education of African-American students. 
11.. The 1994 National. Teacher of the Year has suggested that 85% of those 
incarcerated have dropped out of high school, and that in San Diego, it would cost 
$30,000 to imprison a child but just $4,900 to educate her. Glass, supra note 8. 
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uneducated individuals will find it difficult to exercise the basic rights 
guaranteed United States citizens under the Constitution. For example, 
in order for individuals to most effectively exercise their First Amend-
ment right to speak freely, they must have something. to say. Citizens 
are more likely to have something to say, and to recognize the extent of 
their constitutionally protected right to say it, if they have been educated, 
or are at the very least, literate. 
Members of the business community have participated in the debate 
on education, recognizing that "[t]oday's students are tomorrow's work 
force." 12 Some businesses have participated in school reform efforts 
by forming partnerships with schools to ensure student exposure to 
various career opportunities.13 Also, private, for-profit corporations 
have entered the education business by managing schools or owning and 
operating them, competing with traditionally-managed public and private 
schools. 14 . Large sums have already been spent for education, but 
because of corruption15 and inefficient management, business executives 
are now realizing that pouring more money into failing schools is 
insufficient.16 A primary goal for the companies who manage public 
schools is to establish accountability for educators: 
Weak public-school teachers are transferred from building to building, passing 
problems from one principal to another. Tenure is offered without thorough 
12. Don Vanderveen, Business Ideas Help Grand Rapids Summit, GRAND RAPIDS 
Bus. J., Sept. 6, 1994, § A, at 3. 
13. Id.; see also Glass, supra note 8. 
14. Education Alternatives, Inc. (EAI) has assumed management responsibilities 
for schools in Eagan, Minnesota; Paradise Valley, Arizona; Dade County, Florida; and 
Baltimore, Mary.land. Solomon, supra note l, at 894-903. The company may soon 
manage the entire public school system in Hartford, Connecticut, where the Board of 
Education is looking to EAi to help resolve problems such as violence, drug addiction, 
overcrowded classrooms, poorly maintained school buildings, and overworked teachers. 
Alternatives Considered for Faltering Public Schools (CNN television broadcast, 
Oct. 13, 1994). In Newark, New Jersey, the state is proposing to manage the schools 
to help resolve problems like laziness, poor administration, and corruption. State School 
Takeover Proposed in Newark, New Jersey (CNN television broadcast, Aug. 3, 1994). 
15. See Mike Kelly, Schooling in Politics, THE RECORD, Oct. 13, 1994, at COL 
16. Fortune 500 business executives met at the annual Education Meeting of the 
Conference Board in 1993 to discuss education reform. The former U.S. Secretary of 
Education, Terrel H. Bell, spoke at the meeting, arguing that "[w]e have spent a great 
deal of money in school reform - not very effectively. We have a major personnel-
management problem in the public schools that needs to be addressed." William L. 
Bainbridge & William R. Mason, Jr., Teachers Now Lack Motivation To Excel, 
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Sept. 8, 1994, at 7A. . 
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review. . . . Concepts such as marketplace pay for teachers in areas of 
shortage, peer review, a revamped work year, recognition systems and site-
based management need to be revisited by educators and leaders in government 
and business.17 
Weak teachers are a problem, but this Article is concerned with the 
more serious misconduct of some educators and the fact that these 
teachers are not held accountable. One critical step toward greater 
accountability for educators would be the imposition of civil liability for 
educational malpractice in cases where teachers and their .supervisors 
allow a student to remain in an incorrect and harmful placement. In 
such cases, liability should be. imposed if the educator's actions 
constitute gross negligence. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Although many of America's children are poorly educated,18 there 
is no legal recourse for recipients of a bad education. 19 This is true 
even when children suffer severe mental and emotional harm as a result 
of an educator's grossly negligent evaluation and placement. Even 
though this harm may be far graver than the harm caused by an 
inadequate education, students are denied the opportunity to bring an 
action against grossly negligent educators who misclassify them. This 
Article suggests that in these cases the judiciary has avoided meaningful 
analysis by labelling the plaintiff's cause of action as one for educational 
malpractice and.refusing to then recognize such a cause of action. 
Part II of this Article sets out the two most common types of 
educational malpractice and suggests the educational malpractice label 
is fatal for the plaintiff because the judiciary insists that, for policy 
reasons, it will not recognize a duty owed from educators to their 
17. Id. 
18. Across the United States, urban public schools have failed to provide a good 
education to large numbers of students, especially the poor and racial minorities. 
Gershon M. Ratner, A New Legal Duty For Urban Public Schools: Effective Education 
In Basic Skills, 63 TEX. L. REV. 777, 779 (1985). In some inner city schools, about 70-
80% of students drop out before completing high school. Kristin Helmore, Inadequate 
Education Is Still Part of the Poverty Problem, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 20, 
1986, at 29. One extremely troubled high school in Los Angeles reported that only five 
percent of its senior class were reading at grade level. Id. 
19. See, e.g., D.S.W. v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., 628 P.2d 554 
(Alaska 1981); Doe v. Board of Educ., 295 Md. 67, 453 A.2d 814 (1982); Hunter v. 
Board of Educ,, 292 Md. 481,439 A.2d 582 (1982); Torres v. Little Flower Children's 
Servs., 64 N.Y.2d 119,474 N.E.2d 223,485 N.Y.S.2d 15 (1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 
864 (1985); DeRosa v. City of New York, 132 A.D.2d 592,517 N.Y.S.2d 754 (1987). 
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students. With only one exception,20 plaintiffs in educational malprac-
tice actions have been unsuccessful. Educators are not held accountable 
for even their most negligent behavior. 
This Article is about the lack of accountability of educators and the 
various factors that encourage the judiciary to either .intervene in 
decision-making processes or to defer to , decision-makers, thereby 
disallowing a cause of action against the educators. In what types of 
decisions does the judiciary generally intervene? To answer this 
question, Part III of this Article examines judicial intervention in the 
decisions of corporate directors. In the corporate context, the judiciary 
intervenes in certain decisions by recognizing a duty of care owed from 
corporate directors; it refuses'to intervene in other decisions by granting 
immunity from liability. This Article concludes that the nature of 
decision-making by corporate management is comparable to decision-
making engaged in by educators in the educational malpractice context. 
In both contexts, the judiciary hesitates to intervene because it does not 
want to infringe upon the policy-making domain of corporate directors 
and educators. 
This Article explores the applicability in the school setting of certain 
principles borrowed from corporate law. It examines the concepts 
underlying the business judgment rule to determine the types of 
decisions which the judiciary generally will examine. As in the 
corporate context, courts seek to avoid frivolous lawsuits in the 
education setting, and Part III looks to shareholder derivative actions for 
rules that help to deter frivolous litigation. This Articie then explains 
that judicial unwillingness to recognize a duty owed from educators to 
schoolchildren may be overcome by applying an analogue of the 
business judgment rule and other corporate law principles to help 
alleviate some of the judiciary's concerns in this regard. 
Judges have refused to recognize a duty owed from educators to their 
students, and they enumerate various policy and administrative reasons 
in an attempt to justify this refusal. In Part IV, this Article explores 
these policy concerns and concludes that such concerns do not justify the 
20. See B.M. v. State, 200 Mont. 58, 649 P.2d 425 (1982). The student in B.M 
was misclassified as retarded due to school district's failure to follow statutory and 
regulatory policies governing the placement of students in the special education program. 
This plaintiff is the only person in the United States thus far to have successfully brought 
an educational malpractice suit. 
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failure of the judiciary to recognize a duty in instances of educational 
malpractice. In fact, instead of explaining judicial refusal to recognize 
a duty owed from educators to their students, these policy considerations, 
when properly analyzed, require the imposition of a duty. 
This Article concludes that recognition of a duty owed from educators 
to students will serve two important tort law goals. First, plaintiffs may 
be made whole through counselling or compensation. Second, potential 
liability will serve to deter the type of behavior that causes such mental 
and emotional harm. An analysis similar to that which takes place under 
certain formulations of the business judgment rule will allow for the 
protection of discretionary experimentation with various pedagogical 
approaches while holding educators accountable when they are grossly 
negligent. 
II. Two TYPES OF EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE: THE CASES THAT 
SHOULD BE ACTIONABLE 
There are two prototypical "educational malpractice" cases: actions 
for "misclassification" and actions for the "failure to educate." Hoffman 
v. Board of Education21 is a "misclassification" case in which the 
plaintiff, a child of normal intelligence, spent eleven years of school in 
classes for the mentally retarded. Daniel Hoffman, shortly after entering 
the New York City public school system, was given an intelligence 
quotient (1.Q.) test in which he was required to provide oral responses 
in spite of his known speech defect. Daniel received a score of seventy-
four on the test. Children who scored below seventy-five were placed 
in classes for the mentally retarded. One year before taking this test, the 
plaintiff received a score of ninety on a different type of l.Q. test where 
his speech defect was not an impediment to a score that more accurately 
reflected his ability. .The school psychologist who administered the test 
on which Daniel received a score of seventy-four recommended that he 
be tested again in two years. The psychologist also recommended 
speech therapy. Although achievement tests were given twice a year and 
Daniel showed indications of strong reading potential, he was not 
retested.22 
21. 49 N.Y.2d 121,400 N.E.2d 317,424 N.Y.S.2d 376 (1979). 
22. Laura F. Rothstein, Accountability For Professional Misconduct In Providing 
Education to Handicapped Children, 14 J.L. & EDUC. 349,360 (1985). Rothstein writes 
that this type of misclassification case "is increasingly likely to occur." Id. at 361. 
For other misclassification cases, see D.S.W. v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., 
628 P.2d 554 (Alaska 1981); Smith v. Alameda County Social Servs. Agency, 90 Cal. 
App. 3d 929, 153 Cal. Rptr. 712 (1979); Rich v. Kentucky Country Day, Inc., 793 
S.W.2d 832 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990); B.M. v. State, 200 Mont. 58, 649 P.2d 425 (1982). 
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Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School District 3 is a "failure to 
educate" case. Peter W., the eighteen-year-old plaintiff, graduated from 
twelfth grade with the reading ability of a fifth grader. As in most 
"failure to educate" cases, plaintiff alleged that educators provided 
inadequate instruction and supervision, thereby precluding him from 
attaining basic academic skills.24 
The courts in both Peter W. and Hoffman held that because of public 
policy considerations, the defendants25 did not owe Daniel Hoffman or 
Peter W. a duty of care. One possible explanation for judicial refusal to 
impose a duty on educators is that judges fail to undertake the type of 
thorough examination of defendants' conduct necessary in educational 
malpractice cases. They fail to note the important distinctions in the 
nature of defendants' conduct in these two types of educational 
malpractice claims26 and, more importantly, they fail to see similarities 
between the conduct of defendants in the educational malpractice setting 
and the conduct of defendants in other contexts in which a duty is 
imposed. 
In the "failure to educate" cases, the educators have been inattentive. 
For the most part, these are cases ofnonfeasance consisting of the failure 
to provide corrective assistance to a student burdened with obvious 
impediments to learning.27 The claim is that the educators' non-
23. 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976). 
24. Id. at 815, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 855-56; see also Donohue v. Copiague Union Free 
Sch. Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 418 N.Y.W.2d 375 (1979). 
25. In Peter W., the plaintiff brought his action against the San Francisco Unified 
School District, the school superintendent, the school district's governing board, and the 
individual board members. Peter W., 60 Cal. App. 3d at 815, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 855-56. 
26. The distinction between "failure to educate" and misclassification cases is 
critical when examining the educational malpractice defendant's conduct, yet the 
judiciary fails to distinguish the two types of malpractice. See, e.g., D.S.W. v. Fairbanks 
N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., 628 P.2d 554 (Alaska 1981); Doe v. Board of Educ., 295 
Md. 67,439 A.2d 582 (1982); Torres v. Little Flower Children's Servs., 64 N.Y.2d 119, 
474 N.E.2d 223 (1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985); DeRosa v. City of New York, 
132 A.D.2d 592, 517 N.Y.S.2d 754 (1987). 
27. E.g., Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 
Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976). It must be noted that in the "failure to educate" cases, the harm 
inflicted could be described as misclassification. In other words, plaintiffs could claim 
they remained in classes for students of average ability even though they needed 
remedial assistance. The lack of remedial help is grievous, but it should not be 
considered a misclassification case. Defining misclassification in this broad manner 
could cause the courts to be flooded with claims. 
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feasance causes an educable student to complete her high school 
education barely literate.28 
Even though the educators' nonfeasance in the "failure to educate" 
cases causes serious harm, more egregious conduct may be required 
before the judiciary will overcome its reluctance to involve itself in the 
seemingly insurmountable problems that plague our schools. If the 
judiciary does in fact require flagrantly harmful misbehavior rather than 
mere inattention before intervening,29 the misclassification cases 
provide a context in which such egregious behavior is present. The 
misclassification cases are instances of misfeasance, where an educator's 
affirmative act causes severe harm to a student. The educator's conduct 
is more conspicuously egregious because it involves more than mere 
inattentiveness. The misclassification defendants refuse to rectify the 
severely harmful situations in which they have placed their students. 
The defendants allow plaintiffs to remain in the harmful placement, 
ignoring apparent indications that a grievous error has been committed. 
Defendants' behavior in misclassification cases can be divided into 
two phases. The first phase consists of the educators' negligent 
evaluation, and the misclassification itself. Even though this initial 
decision is wrong, and perhaps negligently made, this decision alone 
should not be actionable. Especially egregious behavior should be 
required in this context because of judicial reluctance to intervene. The 
conduct in the misclassification cases should become actionable only 
after the defendant receives notice of the negligent placement and fails 
to correct the error. This is the second phase of conduct in the typical 
misclassification case: the failure to remove the student from a severely 
28. If a "failure to educate" claim were to be recognized, the student should bear 
the burden of establishing that she is educable. Educators should not be held responsible 
when children are unable to learn because of psychological, emotional, or neurological 
problems. A plaintiff who alleges that educator negligence substantially contributed to 
his illiteracy should be able to show that literacy was attainable. A plaintiff who is 
severely retarded, for example, would be unable to meet this burden. 
Many of the "failure to educate" cases have been brought against public school 
defendants. See, e.g., Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 
814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976); Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 
440, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 418 N.Y.W.2d 375 (1979). "Failure to educate" claims have also 
been brought against private school defendants. See, e.g., Paladino v. Waldorf Sch., 89 
A.D.2d 85, 454 N.Y.S.2d 868 (1982); Helm v. Professional Children's Sch., 103 Misc. 
2d 1053, 431 N.Y.S.2d 246 (1980). In Paladino, the plaintiff also alleged that the 
private school breached its contract to provide plaintiff with a quality education and that 
the school fraudulently misrepresented that plaintiffs education was progressing 
satisfactorily. The plaintiff was unsuccessful on all claims. Paladino, 89 A.D.2d at 86-
87, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 870. 
29. The requirement of gross negligence before the immunity of the business 
judgment rule is overcome is one example of especially harmful behavior serving as a 
prerequisite to judicial intervention. See infra text accompanying notes 44-51. 
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harmful placement.30 The combination of these two phases of con-
duct--the misfeasance of the first phase coupled with the nonfeasance 
of the second phase--constitutes gross negligence, that is, conduct 
egregious enough to be actionable. Thus, even if the inattentiveness in 
the "failure to educate" cases is not serious enough to warrant interven-
tion, educators should be required to act in a way that will not harm 
their students and correct any conspicuously harmful behavior upon 
receiving notice of potential injury to a child. 
For practical reasons, only the misclassification cases should be 
recognized. Because of the nature of both the injury and the educator's 
conduct in the "failure to educate" cases, courts could be flooded with 
these claims if they were recognized. Almost anyone can claim that they 
have suffered mental and emotional harm as a result of an inadequate 
education.31 The failure to educate can be defined in many ways. 
Compelling policy reasons warrant an examination of the "failure to 
educate" cases in order to establish realistic and equitable limitations on 
the definition of this cause of action before it is recognized. Such an 
examination, however, is beyond the scope of this Article. 
If recognized, an action for misclassification should be defined 
narrowly. The claim should be limited to Hoffman-type cases where 
there is gross inattention to a student's placement or reckless disregard 
of the need to re-evaluate the classification. Only those educators who 
demonstrate a conscious lack of concern for the student should be held 
accountable. No liability should be imposed when the educator's 
conduct is not egregious or is something less than gross negligence. For 
30. At first glance, this second step seems identical to the inattentiveness typical 
in the "failure to educate" cases. After the negligent placement is carried out, however, 
the failure to reconsider the student's placement is more than inattentiveness. In a 
particularly egregious case, the school's policy to re-test students after placing them in 
special education classes was ignored, and the plaintiff remained in the harmful 
placement for many years. Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 49 N.Y.2d 121,124,400 N.E.2d 
317, 318-19, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376, 377-78 (1979). Additionally, the defendants had notice 
they had negligently placed Daniel Hoffinan and ignored evidence that he was not, in 
fact, a retarded child. Id. 
31. Additionally, the misclassification cases would arise far less often than the 
"failure to educate" cases simply because misclassification occurs less frequently. This 
depends, of course, on how misclassification is defined. As the definition broadens, the 
number of potential cases obviously increases. Any definition, however, must include 
the type of negligent placement that occurred in Hoffman, the problems of negligent 
tracking, and the "dumping" of students of color in special education programs that will 
not serve their needs. 
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example, cases that involve an initial erroneous classification that is 
rectified in a timely manner should not be actionable. Similarly, actions 
brought by misclassification plaintiffs who allege trivial harm should not 
be recognized.32 In a case like Hoffman, however, the fact that the 
plaintiff has been severely harmed may be inferred from the defendant's 
outrageous conduct, as is done in actions for emotional distress.33 This 
approach will lessen the likelihood of feigned claims. 
It is important to note that plaintiffs may already be able to recover 
for educational injury caused by a defendant's intentional conduct. In 
a recent New York case, Helbig v. City of New York,34 an elementary 
school principal was held accountable for harm to a student caused by 
his intentional conduct. The principal altered the student's reading 
scores in an attempt to improve the reputation of his school. This 
precluded the student from being placed in the type of remedial program 
best suited for him.35 Helbig is a case of intentional misclassification 
rather than negligent misclassification, even though it has been labelled 
as an action for educational malpractice.36 The court described the 
conduct as intentional and particularly harmful, and therefore, the 
plaintiff in Helbig was allowed to recover. Intentional conduct is 
atypical. Helbig's placement in a setting in which he received no 
remedial help is typical of the injury suffered in the negligent misclassi-
fication cases like Hoffman. In Hoffman, for example, the defendants 
32. See, e.g., Hunter v. Board of Educ., 292 Md. 481,439 A.2d 582 (1982). In 
Hunter, the educators required the plaintiff to repeat the first grade by giving him first 
grade materials even though he was placed in a second grade classroom; this conduct 
could not be defined as grossly negligent. Additionally, the plaintiffs harm was less 
than severe: he alleged that he was embarrassed and experienced "depletion of ego 
strength." Id. at 484, 439 A.2d. at 583. 
33. See, e.g., State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 338, 240 
P.2d 282,286 (1952). The egregious nature of the defendant's conduct allows a jury to 
infer that the plaintiffs harm is real. Jurors are able to make this inference based on 
their personal experience. They are asked to determine whether the defendant's conduct 
would have caused them to suffer severe harm. See id. 
34. 157 Misc.2d 487, 597 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1993). 
35. Id. at 489, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 586. Throughout the plaintiffs time in elementary 
school, he scored high on standardized tests but performed poorly in the classroom. Even 
though plaintiff was found to be functioning below average in certain areas upon re-
testing, he was denied access to remedial programs because his standardized scores were 
still remarkably high. After graduating elementary school and proceeding to inter-
mediate school, plaintiffs poor classroom grades continued, and his standardized test 
scores dropped dramatically from elementary school. He was finally classified as 
learning disabled and placed in the proper remedial classes. However, by this point the 
damage was done, as plaintiff was diagnosed as suffering from isolation, heightened 
emotions, and anxiety as a result of not receiving proper education. Id. 
36. See Martin Fox, Education Malpractice Lawsuit Is Allowed; Principal's 
Inflation o/Test Scores a Factor, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 5, 1993, at 1 (headline refers to Helbig 
as an educational malpractice case). 
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deliberately ignored indications of plaintiff's normalcy and intentionally 
refused to retest plaintiff, as was recommended. The difference between 
intentional and reckless or grossly negligent conduct is one of degree, 
and in some of the misclassification cases the differences are extremely 
slight. The similarities between the conduct of the Helbig defendant and 
that of the defendants in cases like Hoffman warrant similar outcomes. 
Like the Helbig defendant, misclassification defendants in especially 
egregious cases should be held accountable.37 
III. IN WHAT TYPES OF DECISIONS DOES THE JUDICIARY 
GENERALLY INTERVENE? 
Three points illustrate the incongruity of judicial inaction in the 
educational malpractice cases when compared to judicial action in other 
contexts. First, when physicians, attorneys, accountants, architects, and 
37. When children are injured in their schools and the injury does not involve 
physical hann, plaintiffs have looked to theories other than malpractice. Plaintiffs have 
sought recovery under express or implied contract arguments, misrepresentation, and 
constitutional law principles. See, e.g., Scott v. Blanchet High Sch., 747 P.2d 1124 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1987) (where teacher allegedly engaged in sexual relations with student, 
parents filed causes of action against school for negligent supervision of teacher and 
student and for breach of contract); B.M. v. State, 200 Mont. 58, 649 P.2d 425 (1982) 
(parents filed claim alleging that misplacement violated constitutional rights of due 
process and equal protection). Some plaintiffs have alleged that defendants in misclassi-
fication and "failure to educate" cases have violated a statutory or constitutional duty to 
educate. In Peter W., for example, plaintiff alleged that the school district violated the 
duty to instruct imposed by the state constitution and the education code. Peter W. v. 
San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 818, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 856 
(1976). The California Court of Appeal concluded that even if defendant failed to fulfill 
its mandate to educate, defendant incurred no liability under the constitution or the code. 
The court found that the code imposes liability only when a defendant's act results in 
an injury against which the statute was designed to protect. The court concluded that 
the sections of the code alleged by the plaintiff to have been breached were "a-
dministrative but not protective" in nature, and "[t]heir violation accordingly imposes no 
liability." Id. at 826-27, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 862. 
In one of his counts the plaintiff in Peter W. alleged negligent misrepresentation. The 
gist of the allegation was that defendants negligently represented to his parents that the 
functionally illiterate student was progressing satisfactorily on the path to literacy. The 
court justified its dismissal of plaintiff's action for negligent misrepresentation by 
invoking the same policy concerns it enumerated in dismissing plaintiffs action for the 
negligent failure to educate. Id. at 827, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 862-63. In the alternative, the. 
Peter W. plaintiff alleged intentional misrepresentation. This claim was dismissed 
because plaintiff failed to establish the reliance element of this cause of action. Id., 131 
Cal. Rptr. at 863, 
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engineers are negligent, they, unlike educators, are held accountable.38 
There is no adequate explanation for judicial recognition of a duty of 
care owing from these individuals to those they serve and nonrecognition 
of a duty owed from educators to their students. The professionals on 
whom a duty of care is imposed and the educators who are free of a 
comparable duty are similarly situated.39 Even after considering the 
debate about whether educators are to be considered professionals, the 
fact still remains that even individuals who may be considered less than 
professional are held accountable for their negligence. Workers engaged 
in certain trades and hair stylists are two examples.40 The distinctions 
between educators and any of the groups on whom a duty of care is 
imposed is minimal. The differences between educators and workers 
who are held accountable do not warrant disparate treatment regarding 
their accountability. 
Second, as acknowledged in Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School 
District, an educational malpractice action satisfies the established 
elements of a negligence cause of action.41 The judiciary's refusal to 
recognize a cause of action for educational malpractice is contrary to 
established precedent. 
Third, the decisions made in the misclassification cases are the types 
of decisions in which the judiciary generally intervenes. The conduct in 
misclassification cases such as Hoffinan is an egregious deviation from 
already established policy and constitutes the kind of conduct that 
requires judicial intervention. In other words, the decisions made in the 
misclassification cases are the types of decisions into which the judiciary 
generally inserts itself in contexts other than educational malpractice. 
These observations illustrate inconsistencies in judicial reaction to 
similarly situated victims. The following sections of this Article 
examine the nature of the defendant's conduct in educational malpractice 
38. See, e.g., Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109,366 N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 
(1977) (medical malpractice); Grago v. Robertson, 49 A.D.2d 645, 370 N.Y.S.2d 255 
(1975) (attorney malpractice); County of Broome v. Vincent J. Smith, Inc., 78 Misc. 2d 
889, 358 N.Y.S.2d 998 (1974) (architect malpractice); Wilkin v. Dana R. Pickup & Co., 
74 Misc. 2d 1025, 347 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1973) (accountant malpractice). 
The debate as to whether teachers are professionals may, at least in this context, be 
extraneous. School supervisors and administrators are undoubtedly professionals. 
39. The incongruity of the judiciary's position is further illustrated by the fact that 
school psychologists are not held accountable for their negligence even though they 
would be held accountable under the same circumstances in contexts other than the 
school setting. See, e.g., Chambers v. Ingram, 858 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1988); Bullion v. 
Gadaleto, 872 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Va. 1995). 
40. See, e.g., Wagner v. Kenific, 161 A.D.2d 1092, 557 N.Y.S.2d 650 (1990) 
(plumber liability); Alston v. Monk, 92 N.C. App. 59,373 S.E.2d 463 (1988) (hair stylist 
liability). 
41. See infra text accompanying notes 115-18. 
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and the kind of conduct that generally warrants judicial intervention in 
the corporate context. To undertake this examination, one must first 
consider the qualified immunity granted to certain decisions of corporate 
directors.· 
A. Accountability and Deference-A Corporate Model 
A critical distinction must be made between the types of educators' 
decisions that are deserving of protection and the types that are not. In 
explaining their rejection ofeducational malpractice claims, courts have 
stated that pedagogical policy-making is best left to experts in education 
rather than the judiciary.42 While this explanation may support the full 
immunity granted to educators' policy determinations, it does not support 
the complete immunity given to merely administrative decisions or other 
decisions that do not relate to pedagogical policy. Judicial posture 
regarding the decision-making of educators and that of corporate 
directors is similar. In both the corporate and the education contexts, 
courts reluctant to displace the judgment of experts for their own defer 
to the judgment of corporate and education management.43 In deferring 
to educators' decisions in educational malpractice claims, however, 
courts fail to apply the significant qualifications which they implement 
when deferring to corporate management decisions. 
The decisions of corporate management are protected under the 
business judgment rule, which· grants a broad immunity to management 
decisions. Even the decisions of corporate management that reflect poor 
and erroneous judgment are protected under the business judgment 
rule.44 "The. business judgment rule exists to protect and promote the 
full and free exercise of the managerial power granted to . . . direc-
tors. "45 Corporate managers, however, must satisfy certain prerequisites 
in order for courts to defer to their decisions. The presumption of 
adequate decision-making will be granted under the business judgment 
42. See, e.g., Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 
131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976); Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 
391 N.E.2d 1352, 418 N.Y.W.2d 375 (1979); Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 49 N.Y.2d 
121,400 N.E.2d 317,424 N.Y.S.2d 376 (1979). 
43. See id.; see also Kamin v. American Express Co., 86 Misc. 2d 809, 383 
N.Y.S.2d 807, aff'd, 54 A.D.2d 654, 387 N.Y.S.2d 993 (1976). 
44. Kamin, 86 Misc. 2d at 813, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 811. 
45. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 782 (Del. 1981). 
449 
rule only if the decision was made without gross negligence, fraud, or 
dishonesty.46 If, however, decisions are made in bad faith, or the 
decisions result from the exercise of gross negligence, the rule's 
protection is lost and courts will carefully scrutinize management's 
behavior.47 For example, if a director's decision is not a result of 
adequate deliberation, or the decision is made in a grossly negligent 
manner, the director is said to have violated the fiduciary duty of 
care.48 In addition to satisfying the duty of care, another prerequisite 
to the protection of the business judgment rule is that the director must 
satisfy the fiduciary duty of loyalty.49 The duty of loyalty may be 
breached when a director's conflict of interest is not disclosed and 
ratified.50 In these circumstances, a conflict of interest may exist when 
the corporation for which the director serves enters into a contract or 
engages in a transaction with the director or an entity in which the 
director has a financial interest, or for which the director serves as an 
officer or director; such a transaction is voidable unless shown by its 
proponent to be fair, and reasonable to the corporation.51 
The decisions of school managers, however, are completely immune 
from judicial review, because the judiciary disallows educational 
malpractice actions even when educators' decisions are the product of 
gross negligence.52 Unlike corporate managers, education managers 
have no prerequisites to satisfy before their decisions enjoy complete 
immunity. Educators have no duties of loyalty or care to satisfy; they 
46. Kamin, 86 Misc. 2d at 813,383 N.Y.S.2d at 811. 
47. In at least one instance a court will exercise its own business judgment even 
when the requirements for protection of management decisions under the business 
judgment rule are met. Delaware courts may disregard a special litigation committee's 
decision to prevent derivative litigation and substitute its own business judgment to 
conclude that the derivative suit is in the best interests of the corporation. Zapata, 430 
A.2d at 783-84. 
48. See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 
488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 87 N.J. 15, 432 A.2d 814 
(1981). 
49. Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 6 (Sup. Ct. 1944). See generally Lewis v. 
S.L. & E., Inc., 629 F.2d 764, 769 (2d Cir. 1980). 
50. See Bayer, 49 N.Y.S.2d at 1 I. 
51. Lewis, 629 F.2d at 769. 
52. The Peter W. court acknowledged the abolition of governmental immunity 
from tort liability. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 
819, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 857 (1976). The judiciary, however, in effect restores 
governmental immunity in a school setting by automatically refusing to recognize 
plaintiffs' claims, except in the case of physical injuries. This de facto restoration of 
governmental immunity by the judiciary extends further than the doctrine of governmen-
tal immunity itself, which applies only to discretionary acts. In the school setting, 
however, the de facto immunity applies even though defendant's acts may not be 
discretionary. 
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owe no duty at all to their students. The protection of the business 
judgment rule applies to the decisions of corporate directors only where 
they have exercised judgment. The exercise of judgment requires some 
minimal investigation and deliberation. In the negligent misclassification 
cases, however, the educators failed to deliberate or undertake even a 
minimal investigation. Thus, there is no justification for the complete 
immunity educators' decisions enjoy. This becomes especially clear 
after considering the underlying rationale for the judiciary's deference 
to corporate management decisions. 
The reasons given for deferring to corporate decisions do not apply in 
the education context, yet the judiciary completely defers to educators' 
decisions while corporate management decisions enjoy an immunity that 
is far less complete. For example, courts grant immunity to corporate 
management decisions under the business judgment rule because 
shareholders "voluntarily undertake the risk of bad business judgment" 
when they decide to invest in an enterprise. 53 The same assertion 
cannot be made about schoolchildren. Students have not voluntarily 
undertaken the risk of bad judgment of those charged with educating 
them. Shareholders have choices about whether and in what to invest. 
Students do not enjoy similar choices. All must attend school, and those 
who attend public schools are compelled to attend a particular school to 
which their parents must entrust them. 
Courts also defer to corporate management decisions because they 
"recognize that after-the-fact litigation is a most imperfect device to 
evaluate" such decisions.54 Courts realize that the business setting 
53. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982). 
54. Id. at 886. One of the concerns with after-the-fact judicial evaluation is that 
jurors, or the court, will automatically interpret a bad outcome to be evidence of a 
negligently made decision. Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule: 
Meaningless Verbiage Or Misguided Notion?, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 287, 306 (1994). In 
the misclassification cases, however, there is much more than a bad result on which to 
focus. In Hoffman, for example, fact finders would have had a series of grossly 
negligent decisions by which to measure defendants' conduct. See supra text 
accompanying notes 21-22. 
An additional reason the judiciary avoids such second-guessing of business decisions 
is that courts lack sufficient business expertise to ensure an adequate review. The 
judiciary makes a similar assertion with respect to pedagogical decisions. One 
commentator, however, questions the validity of this assertion by observing that the 
judiciary is required to make similarly difficult evaluations of the decisions of other 
professionals. Gevurtz, supra, at 307. For example, judges, in spite of never having 
attended medical or engineering school, review the decisions of doctors and engineers 
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requires quick decision-making, and the hurried and frenetic environ-
ment in which business decisions are made is not easily replicated in a 
courtroom. 55 Educators, on the other hand, are not required to make 
their decisions in such an environment. In misclassification cases such 
as Hoffinan, educators have months to evaluate and deliberate before 
making a decision. 
Another reason courts defer to corporate management decisions is to 
create incentives for risk-taking by management that may result in 
greater profits for investors. The judiciary's deference to corporate 
management determinations under the business judgment rule is intended 
to deter "overly cautious corporate decisions" that may preclude profit 
maximization.56 Courts recognize that shareholders are able to decrease 
the amount of risk to which they are exposed by diversifying their 
holdings.57 While some of their investments expose them to great risk, 
shareholders, the courts assert, are able to invest in other, less risky, 
enterprises. While these observations about investors are true, it would 
seem that caution would be a crucial attribute for educators, since 
schoolchildren, obviously, are unable to "diversify." When children 
attend school, they invest their lives and future and should not be 
expected to incur risks that cannot be offset with safer alternatives. 
Most children attending inadequate public schools have no alternatives. 
Expecting educators to be cautious, however, does not preclude 
immunity for their decisions to experiment with new pedagogical 
approaches; this type of risk-taking should be encouraged. The potential 
assignment of liability in misclassification cases such as Hoffman would 
not involve judicial review of an educator's decision to attempt a new 
pedagogical procedure. No such attempt was made in Hoffman. On 
the contrary, misclassification cases, where the type of egregious conduct 
that was evident in Hoffman is present, involve the type of risk-taking 
that must be discouraged by the assignment of liability. Educators will 
not be able to argue that they are discouraged from undertaking new 
pedagogical techniques if they are liable only for grossly negligent 
with the help of expert testimony. It is difficult to see why the same type of assistance 
from experts would not enable the judiciary to review decisions made by educators. 
Furthermore, it must be noted that only legal expertise, not educational expertise, is 
required in order to review the type of grossly negligent decision-making that occurs in 
misclassification cases such as Hoffman. 
55. Joy, 692 F.2d at 886. 
56. Id. 
57. "[C]ourts need not bend over backwards to give special protection to 
shareholders who refuse to reduce the ... risk by not diversifying." Id. 
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conduct which, by definition, will not include experimenting with new 
pedagogical approaches.58 
Another argument in support of special liability rules for directors is 
that these rules shield them from the inordinate level of liability to which 
they would be exposed under ordinary negligence rules. The argument 
is that the increased potential for liability that could result in tremendous 
monetary loss to directors would dissuade qualified individuals from 
joining the board. Since liability in the education context would be 
limited to severely egregious conduct under the approach proposed in 
this Article, conscientious teachers and administrators would not be 
dissuaded from entering the field. 
An often-articulated justification for professional malpractice liability 
is the possibility of deterring negligent behavior by doctors, lawyers, 
accountants, directors, and engineers that causes harm to those they 
serve. Some commentators, however, question the efficacy of director 
liability, arguing that a director's negligent behavior is effectively 
deterred by other factors.59 These factors include economic incentives 
such as: 
stock ownership by directors in their corporation, compensation schemes which 
tie financial rewards to corporate performance, the desire of officers and 
directors to develop and preserve their reputations for business acumen so as to 
advance their individual careers, and the fear that poor decisions will make the 
corporation a takeover target and result in the current directors losing their 
positions. 60 
The argument for accountability of public school educators and 
administrators is supported by these observations, because none of these 
economic incentives exist in the education setting to serve as potential 
sources of deterrence. There are no market incentives for the satisfacto-
58. Corporate directors and doctors, for example, protest that potential liability 
makes them overly cautious and precludes the type of risk-taking that leads to important 
new business approaches and medical discoveries. Gevurtz, supra note 54, at 305-06. 
Physicians also complain that the threat of liability forces them to take defensive 
measures that needlessly increase the cost of health care. The most significant defensive 
measures that could be taken in the education setting are ensuring that testing is 
performed without negligence and paying attention to indications that an evaluation was 
erroneous. These types of defensive measures are highly desirable and are not likely to 
increase education costs, because they involve behavior in which the educators are 
already paid to engage. 
59. Gevurtz, supra note 54, at 319. 
60. Id. Other actors, including professionals such as trial attorneys, encounter 
similar market incentives to perform well. Id. 
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ry performance of educators. Teachers have no economic stake in their 
schools. · Merit pay for teachers and administrators is rare and therefore 
their compensation remains unrelated to their performance. There is no 
need to ensure an unimpaired reputation in the field because neither 
advancement nor retention in this career depends on this. After having 
received tenure, it is unlikely that a schoolteacher or administrator will 
lose her position for anything other than criminal behavior or conduct 
that results in a child's serious physical injury.61 
Educators' decisions should be immune from judicial review only if 
the process by which such decisions are reached satisfies prerequisites 
similar to those imposed in the corporate setting before the protection of 
the business judgment rule is bestowed.62 Education managers,63 like 
their corporate counterparts, should not be held accountable for mere 
errors in judgment or for unsuccessful pedagogical decisions. Like 
corporate managers, educators should be held accountable only when 
they are grossly negligent.64 Additionally, as with corporate directors, 
61. Interview with Margaret Bing Wade, Director of Auxiliary Services for High 
Schools, New York City Board of Education, in New York, N.Y. (May 22, 1994). 
62. Directors must satisfy duties of loyalty and care before the immunity under the 
business judgment rule will be granted to them or their decisions. See supra text 
accompanying note 48-51. Before similar prerequisites to the granting of immunity can 
be applied in the education setting, courts should first recognize that educators owe their 
students a duty of care. See supra text accompanying note 39-40. 
In the corporate setting the protection of the business judgment rule applies only to 
top management. Lower-level corporate employees are subject to a higher·standard of 
care under ordinary negligence rules. In the context of educational malpractice, the 
protection of an analogue to the business judgment rule should be granted to teachers, 
supervisors, and administrators. Since the judiciary is reluctant to intervene in the 
decision-making of educators, no employee in the school setting should be subject to 
ordinary negligence rules. This means paraprofessionals and school volunteers, for 
example, would be subject to neither a special rule of liability in which an analogue to 
the business judgment rule is applied, nor to ordinary rules of negligence or malpractice. 
This conclusion is necessary because teachers, supervisors, and administrators make the 
types of decisions in the school setting analogous to the business decisions made by 
corporate directors. Therefore, they deserve similar immunity. On the other hand, 
paraprofessionals, volunteers, and similarly situated employees make no such 
determinations and therefore will continue to enjoy immunity under the present no-duty 
rule applied in the education setting. Finally, school psychiatrists, doctors, or therapists 
should be subject to the same rules of liability applicable to others in their profession 
who perform outside the school environment. These professionals in the school setting 
should not enjoy immunity from liability that their colleagues in other settings do not 
enjoy. 
63. In this context, the term "education managers" includes not only supervisors 
.and administrators, but also the teachers themselves, who should be considered managers 
of their classrooms. 
64. The analysis would be similar to that which occurs under the traditional rules 
of landowner liability to entrants onto their land. In some states, the landowner owes 
a lesser duty of care when the entrant is classified as a trespasser or licensee. Conduct 
that is very close to gross negligence is required before a landowner will be found liable 
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educators should be required to "inform themselves ... of all material 
information reasonably available to them" before making pedagogical 
decisions.65 
B. The Business Judgment Rule Helps in Determining the Types of 
Decisions in which the Judiciary Intervenes 
One of the basic formulations of the business judgment rule is that 
"the directors' business judgment cannot be attacked unless their 
judgment was arrived at in a negligent manner, or was tainted by fraud, 
conflict of interest, or illegality."66 Some commentators have conclud-
ed that this expression of the rule is analytically identical to other 
liability rules.67 One commentator argues that, at least under this 
formulation, the business judgment rule adds nothing new to the analysis 
of directors' behavior and that the same principle applies to all other 
actors. His position is that no actor's judgment is attacked unless that 
judgment is made negligently, fraudulently, or illegally.68 
to trespassers. See w. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS § 57 {5th ed. 1984). 
It should be noted that this lower standard of care applies in the trespass situation 
because these entrants are deemed less worthy of protection since they infringe upon the 
landowner's right to exclusive possession. In spite of their wrongdoing, trespassers are 
protected under tort law principles. Schoolchildren should at least be granted protection 
similar to that which is granted this category of entrants. 
65. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,812 (Del. 1984) (describing the duty of care 
owed by corporate management). 
66. ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 124 (1986). 
67. Gevurtz, supra note 54, at 293. 
68. Id. at 303. In his article, Gevurtz questions the utility of the business judgment 
rule. He contends that the justifications for a special rule of liability for corporate 
directors also apply to other professionals who do not enjoy protection under special 
liability rules. Because professionals such as physicians and attorneys, whose decisions 
are reviewed under ordinary malpractice or negligence rules, are similarly situated to 
corporate directors, Gevurtz argues that special liability rules for directors are 
unwarranted. 
Gevurtz's evaluation of the business judgment rule is far from universal. In fact, the 
rule's application was recently extended to yet another context. Demonstrating the 
continued utility of the rule, J. Carter Beese, Commissioner of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, advocated that the protection of the rule be granted to corporate 
officers who, on behalf of a company offering and selling its securities, make predictions 
about the future performance of the company, its business, and its securities. Beese 
Favors Business Judgment Rule as Safe Harbor for Forward Stat{e]ments, 26 Sec. Reg. 
& L. Rep. (BNA) 835, 835 (June IO, 1994). 
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A second expression of the rule is that directors will be held liable for 
their decisions only if they are culpable of something more than ordinary 
negligence. This approach is also criticized because of the absence of 
consensus as to the exact nature of the special rule of liability for 
directors. In other words, if something more than ordinary negligence 
is required, what is the "something more"? Many courts, in analyzing 
the rule under this formulation, conclude that the requisite conduct for 
director liability is gross negligence.69 The decision to require gross 
negligence, however, creates additional analytical problems in defining 
and identifying conduct that is grossly negligent.70 
Despite these interpretive difficulties with the business judgment rule, 
it remains an analytical tool that may be useful if its analogue is applied 
in the judicial review of educators' decisions. Even if one rejects the 
feasibility of the rule's practical application, the analysis of corporate 
directors' decisions as performed under the rule is helpful in determining 
the manner of potential judicial review of educators' decisions. The 
various approaches taken by courts in formulating the principles and 
analyses underlying the business judgment rule assist in recognizing the 
types of decisions in which the judiciary generally intervenes. 
One type of decision-making regularly subject to judicial review is 
decision-making that is grossly negligent. In spite of judicial preferences 
to defer to corporate directors' decision-making, grossly negligent 
decisions are not immune from judicial review. Judicial deference 
applies to protect the policy decisions of directors. Courts are loath to 
interfere with the judgment and expertise of corporate management. 
Courts are not reluctant, however, to intervene where directors fail to 
exercise judgment and make use of their expertise. Such failure on the 
part of corporate management is the essence of grossly negligent 
decision-making. 71 
69. Other courts inquire about the director's subjective intent when making the 
challenged decision. Gevurtz, supra note 54, at 296. The relevant inquiry is whether 
the director's decision was the result of her belief that she was acting in the best interest 
of the corporation. This approach is troublesome because it is plagued with the 
problems of proof and credibility generally involved in any inquiry into an actor's 
subjective motivation. Id. at 296-303. 
70. Id. at 300. Gevurtz, however, also recognizes that "one should not dismiss the 
term gross negligence too quickly. Even if not amenable to precise definition, most 
individuals would have no trouble understanding that gross negligence entails some 
worse level of dereliction than ordinary negligence." Id. 
71. Judicial willingness to review the grossly negligent decisions of directors 
extends to decisions derived from inattentiveness. See, e.g., Francis v. United Jersey 
Bank, 87 N.J. 15, 432 A.2d 814 (1981). The misclassification cases involve decision-
making characterized by a failure to exercise judgment and by inattentiveness on the 
educator's part. The first decision in these cases entails the negligently made 
classification. This is a failure to exercise judgment and is therefore the type of decision 
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The same principle may be easily applied in the misclassification 
cases. While it is true that in the educational malpractice context courts 
are especially reluctant to interfere with the judgment and expertise of 
educators, the misclassification cases are instances of grossly negligent 
decision-making characterized by a lack of judgment. The recognition 
of a duty of care owed from educators to their students in the misclassi-
fication cases would not involve judicial interference with the policy 
determinations of educators. Recognition of a duty in the misclassifica-
tion cases would require the judiciary to intervene only in those 
instances where educators are grossly negligent in failing to carry out 
predetermined policy. The decision-making typical in the misclassifica-
tion cases is essentially the type of conduct in which the judiciary 
generally intervenes. More specifically, it is grossly negligent conduct 
bereft of the exercise of judgment or the employment of expertise. 
Specificity in describing the nature of the defendant's conduct in a 
misclassification case assists in the analysis of potential judicial 
intervention in the educational malpractice context. If the judiciary's 
reluctance to intervene in the education setting is explained by its 
deference to the judgment of educators, it must be noted that the 
misclassification cases are not limited to instances of mistaken judgment. 
The negligent evaluation and initial placement involve the exercise of 
judgment on the educator's part, albeit negligent judgment. The decision 
to ignore visible indications that a harmful placement has been made 
and the failure to follow prescribed procedure such as re-evaluation do 
not in any way involve the exercise of judgment. This conduct is best 
described as the negligent administration of education. The policy 
determinations, with which the courts do not wish to interfere, have been 
previously made by the appropriate educators. The conduct in the 
misclassification cases involves the grossly negligent refusal to carry out 
this predetermined policy.72 
in which the judiciary has generally been willing to intervene. The essence of the 
defendant's second decision in the misclassification cases involves inattentiveness or, 
more specifically, a decision to avoid paying attention. We see this in Hoffman where 
defendants ignored obvious indications that Daniel Hoffinan had been negligently placed 
in a potentially harmful setting. Again, this second phase of the defendant's decision-
making involves the type of conduct the judiciary ordinarily will examine outside the 
educational malpractice context. 
72. One of the public policy choices expressed by the courts was adherence to the 
state constitutional and legislative mandate that governance of public schools should 
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The defendant's conduct in Hoffman is a clear example of decision-
making unrelated to the establishment or implementation of policy; it is 
misfeasance that constitutes gross negligence.73 Defendants' decisions 
in Hojfman14 involved more than a mere error in judgment, and this 
egregious conduct continued long after defendants should have 
discovered the plaintiff was placed in a severely harmful situation. The 
educators in Hoffman failed to "inform themselves ... of all material 
information reasonably available to them[,]" as required of corporate 
directors,75 even after they had notice that they had placed the student 
ultimately remain with city and state education officials, and not with the courts. The 
court was intent upon preserving the power of these governing entities to exercise their 
"professional judgment and discretion." Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., 
47 N.Y.2d 440,444,391 N.E.2d 1352, 1354, 418 N.Y.W.2d 375,378 (1979). The court 
wanted no role in judging the "validity" or the "implementation" of "broad educational 
policies." The court obviously misconstrued the nature of Edward Donohue's complaint. 
Plaintiffs alleging injury resulting from an educator's negligent teaching do not ask 
courts to review the validity or implementation of educational policies. On the contrary, 
the "failure to educate" plaintiff confirms the validity of educational policies and would 
welcome their implementation. When an educator ignores visible signs of functional 
illiteracy and continues to promote a student year after year without addressing the 
student's learning difficulties, the educator defies school policy. The defendant's 
conduct in these cases is antithetical to sound educational policies. The conduct 
complained of has nothing to do with the professional judgment and discretion employed 
to establish educational policy. The Donohue court, however, did observe that the 
judiciary would be compelled to intervene in order to rectify "gross violations of defined 
public policy." Id. at 445, 391 N.E.2d at 1354, 418 N.Y.W.2d at 378. The defendant's 
conduct in Donohue was such a violation. For practical reasons, however, in spite of 
the foregoing observations, the "failure to educate" cases should not be actionable. See 
supra text accompanying note 31. 
73. In Hoffman, defendants misclassified plaintiff by placing him, a "normal" 
child, in a class for the mentally retarded. Plaintiff spent years in the negligent 
placement, during which time defendants ignored indications that plaintiff was not 
retarded and failed to implement their own policy of periodic re-testing. Hoffman v. 
Board of Educ., 49 N.Y.2d 121, 125, 400 N.E.2d 317, 319, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376, 378 
{1979). 
74. In Hoffman and other misclassification cases, the initial decision that involved 
the negligent placement should not be actionable because the conduct does not rise to 
the level of egregiousness that should be required in these cases. See supra text 
accompanying note 32. There is, however, a second phase of defendant's conduct in 
these cases that initially does not seem to involve any decision-making, but which upon 
deeper analysis is clearly shown to be the making of a decision. In this second phase 
the educator "decides" to refuse to follow established policies for re-testing and also 
decides to ignore apparent indications that the student has been negligently placed in a 
setting that will inflict severe harm. These decisions should be actionable because they 
involve egregious misconduct. This second phase of defendant's conduct involves the 
decision not to act, which is essentially "nonfeasance." Defendants in the misclas-
sification cases, however, should only be held liable for their gross negligence when the 
.nonfeasance of the second phase is coupled with their earlier "misfeasance," which was 
the negligent classification and placement. 
75. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
458 
[VOL. 32: 437, 1995] Educational Malpractice 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
in a severely harmful situation. They ignored the "obvious danger 
signs"76 that should have led them to recognize plaintiff's distress. 
Another approach to the business judgment rule is one that emphasizes 
the director's decision-making process rather than the substance of 
decisions. This approach requires judicial review of the process by 
which directors arrive at their decisions and judicial deference to the 
substance of their decisions.77 This approach to the business judgment 
rule also illuminates the types of decisions which the judiciary will 
generally review. Under this formulation of the rule, the judiciary is 
able to avoid interfering with corporate policy-making. By not 
reviewing the substance of directors' decisions, the judiciary avoids 
reviewing policy determinations. It remains important, however, for the 
judiciary to review the process of decision-making. The judiciary is 
comfortable with its ability to review the decision-making process 
because it relates to conduct essentially administrative in nature. 
Similarly, the misclassification cases involve conduct that is funda-
mentally administrative. The grossly negligent decisions made in cases 
like Hoffman do not involve the making of policy.78 These decisions 
reflect the failure to implement predetermined policy. Judicial interfer-
ence with the administrative decisions that form the gist of the misclassi-
fication cases will not insert the judiciary into the pedagogical policy-
76. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers, 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963) (stating in dicta that 
directors would be liable for corporate losses if they-were inattentive to "obvious danger 
signs of employee wrongdoing"). 
77. Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 
(1979). Another variation of the same approach is to apply a lower standard of care 
when reviewing a director's substantive decision than the standard used to review the 
director's decision-making process. For example, The American Law Institute's 
Principles of Corporate Governance require that a director establish that he reasonably 
believed that the appropriate process was used to reach a decision. The standard of 
judicial review of the substance of the decision is lower. The director need only 
establish that he rationally believed the decision to be in the corporation's best interest. 
Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations, 1 A.LI. 
§ 4.0l(c)(3) (1994). 
78. In apparent accord with judicial decisions in educational malpractice cases, 
Prosser writes, "It is to be expected that choice of curriculum or teaching materials, or 
location of schools themselves, would ordinarily be discretionary matters for which there 
is no liability." KEETON ET AL., supra note 64, § 131, at 1049. Prosser is right. The 
enumerated matters are policy determinations. These types of decisions must be distin-
guished, however, from the types of choices made in the misclassification cases which 
do not involve discretionary matters like curriculum choice or teaching materials. Not 
even Prosser deals with the extremely difficult issue of the negligent actions of educators 
that are not discretionary, i.e., the decisions that do not establish policy. 
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making it seeks to avoid. Courts would merely intervene in the process 
of implementing already-established pedagogical policy. As in the 
corporate context, this process review would involve consideration of 
whether educators devoted adequate time and attention in reaching the 
challenged decisions. The relevant inquiry would be whether educators 
possessed enough information to reach an informed decision. 79 In 
Hoffinan, for example, this type of inquiry would require the conclusion 
that the defendants' decision-making process was inadequate. The time 
and attention paid to Daniel Hoffman's disabilities and placement were 
detrimentally insufficient; All of the decisions concerning Daniel 
Hoffman were negligently uninformed. 
C. Corporate Principles of Accountability and Their Application to 
the School Setting: What a Cause of Action in Educational 
Malpractice Should Look Like 
The accountability.of educators is a crucial element of an efficiently 
administered education system, and would be most effectively achieved 
in the public school setting by adopting certain corporate law concepts 
relating to shareholder derivative suits, specifically procedural prerequi-
sites that must be satisfied before such suits may be brought. The 
establishment of special litigation committees and the application of an 
analogue to the business judgment doctrine would help to allay some of 
the judicial concerns that have precluded educator accountability.80 
79. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985) (holding that 
corporate directors must "inform themselves of all information reasonably available to 
them and relevant to their decision" in order to satisfy their duty of care and enjoy 
qualified immunity under the business judgment rule). 
80. It is natural to look to corporate law principles in resolving certain analytical 
dilemmas in tort law, as tort law principles have often resolved conceptual problems 
arising in corporate law. There are two important examples. First, the descriptions of 
the duty of care owed by corporate insiders to the corporation and its shareholders and 
the standard of care imposed under tort law are fundamentally identical. An alleged 
tortfeasor is expected to behave as a reasonable and prudent person under similar 
circumstances. KEETON ET AL., supra note 64, §§ 28-30. Corporate officers and 
directors are expected to use the care that "an ordinarily prudent person in a like position 
would use under similar circumstances." N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717 (McKinney 
1977). But see Gevurtz, supra note 54, at 333 ("[S]uch language, to the common 
lawyer's understanding, is synonymous with the standard for ordinary negligence. This 
creates an apparent conflict when courts apply the business judgment rule to preclude 
director liability for ordinary negligence."). 
Second, proximate cause discussions are sometimes as important in determining the 
liability of corporate management as they are in holding alleged tortfeasors accountable. 
See, e.g., Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 87 N.J. 15,432 A.2d 814 (1981). In Francis, 
a director of a reinsurance broker was held accountable to the corporation's creditors for 
nonfeasance even though she was elderly and bedridden. The company suffered losses 
because the two remaining directors, who happened to be defendant's sons, looted the 
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The application of corporate law and governance principles in the 
school setting has been extremely efficacious.81 Chicago's experimen-
tal Corporate/Community Schools of America (C/CSA) in North 
Lawndale is a brilliant·illustration of the wisdom of applying corporate 
principles in the education context.82 Teachers at C/CSA are held 
accountable for their actions. For example, salary increments are based 
company. The court found that the breach of the director's duty of care was the 
proximate cause of the company's losses even though she in no way took part in the 
theft. She was held liable because she failed to prevent it. KEETON ET AL., supra note 
64, §§ 42-45. Id. at 21,432 A.2d at 817. 
81. Education Alternatives, Inc., a private company organized for profit, has taken 
over nine Baltimore, Maryland schools and will soon run schools in Hartford, 
Connecticut. Representatives of the company have also met with the chancellor of New 
York City's public schools. The company claims that it can improve education for the 
same amount of money that is now spent by public schools, and of course, the company 
still plans to profit. Liz Willen, For-Profit School Firm Eyes City, N.Y. NEWSDAY, 
Sept. 1, 1994, at A3. This type of arrangement must be distinguished from the proposals 
made in this article to apply certain corporate principles in the education setting. It may 
be beneficial to apply corporate governance principles in the school setting. It is quite 
another thing to allow a private company to run the school. The tension between the 
imperative profit-maximization goal of the company and the goal to improve education 
is troublesome. What will happen to the children if the company loses money? 
82. The idea for C/CSA originated when its creator encountered a young woman 
who walked into a community agency with her high school diploma asking that someone 
teach her how to read it. This stunned Joseph Kellman, C/CSA's president and founder. 
As a result of this encounter, he solicited corporate support for school reform and raised 
enough money to underwrite C/CSA. Patricia Skalka, This School Means Business, 
READER'S DIG., Feb. 1994, at 99-100. 
The author of the Reader's Digest article recounts several stories of individual success 
that demonstrate the outrageousness of the judiciary's position that educators should not 
be accountable to their students because of the inability to prove a tangible connection 
between an educator's negligence and a student's success or failure. The students of 
North Lawndale suffer from the environmental and emotional problems described by 
some courts in explaining why they are unable to find a causal connection between the 
educator's conduct and the student's harm. Instead of giving up on these troubled 
children as the judiciary has, Kellman and other entrepreneurs search for answers to the 
tough problems facing these children and our entire society by providing adequate 
education. C/CSA provides a caring environment in which discipline and academic 
achievement are emphasized. All students, regardless of traditional predictors of 
academic success, participate in innovative programs where much is expected of them, 
thereby avoiding the stigma that results in tracking students with low predictors. And 
just as important, the walls of the school were freshly painted so that students learn in 
a clean and orderly physical environment in which they have sufficient tools and 
equipment such as computers and a media center. This is in sharp contrast to the filth 
and dearth of equipment that plagues most public schools attended by poor or minority 
children. In addition to these educational improvements, C/CSA makes direct attempts 
to resolve some of the environmental factors that may impede learning, by intervening 
in severe family problems when necessary. Id. at 100-01. 
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on merit, and teachers who do not meet certain performance standards 
are discharged.83 The principal, who is also the school's chief execu-
tive officer, has the power to hire and fire faculty, administration, and 
staff. C/CSA is structured as business organizations are and applies 
principles of corporate governance that include requiring the school's 
principal to answer to a board of directors on which corporate managers 
serve. In a neighborhood with extremely high unemployment, where 
drugs and gangs dominate and consume the lives of many, C/CSA has 
yielded noticeable academic improvements.84 
Early in the history of state corporation law, shareholders were 
empowered with the ability to bring civil actions against directors and 
officers to hold them accountable for misconduct in running the 
corporation. These actions, called shareholder derivative suits, are 
equitable remedies that were "born of stockholder helplessness" in 
protecting themselves from directors who were "not subject to an 
effective accountability."85 Laws regulating corporate managers were 
insufficient to protect shareholders from abusive practices, and this 
insufficiency in the business code eventually led to the institution of 
management accountability through shareholder derivative litigation.86 
83. Id. at 100. Teachers in the public schools are not held accountable for poor 
performance. Their salaries are not affected by poor performance, nor is it possible to 
discharge an ineffective teacher. In one instance, for example, a principal complained 
about a teacher who was slowly destroying one of her school's programs. He was 
unable to get along with other teachers in his department and he seemed to care very 
little about his students. He relied on his colleagues to accomplish most of the tasks that 
he was expected to perform. The principal lamented that the only remedy available to 
her to resolve this problem was to transfer the teacher to another program, or another 
school. He would then be someone else's problem. Interview with Margaret Bing 
Wade, Director of Auxiliary Services for High Schools, New York City Board of 
Education, in New York, N.Y. (May 22, 1994). 
84. In 1990, some of C/CSA's students ranked in the 26th percentile in math 
ability and in the 17th in English ability under national standardized tests. When the 
same C/CSA students were tested two years later, their math scores doubled and their 
English scores more than tripled. The amount of money spent on each C/CSA student 
was comparable to that spent in Chicago's public schools. Skalka, supra note 82, at 
102. 
Another indication of success is that over 85% of the parents of C/CSA students 
regularly attend school meetings, and a majority of them serve as classroom volunteers. 
Id. at 101. This is in sharp contrast to the problem of parental apathy that afflicts many 
public schools. 
85. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 547-48 (1949). The 
derivative suit is brought on behalf of the corporation. In most instances, the corporation 
is named as plaintiff AND defendant. Directors and officers are also generally named 
as defendants in a derivative action. See, e.g., id. at 543 ("[This is an] action in the right 
of the Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation, a Delaware corporation. . . . The 
defendants were the corporation and certain of its managers and directors."). 
86. "Corporate laws were lax and were not self-enforcing, and stockholders, in face 
of gravest abuses, were singularly impotent in obtaining redress of abuses of trust." Id. 
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Courts have acknowledged that shareholder derivative litigation has been 
an effective incentive for corporate management to avoid breaches of 
their fiduciary duties that cause harm to the corporation and derivative 
harm to shareholders.87 Holding educators accountable for grossly 
negligent conduct that causes severe injury would provide similar 
incentives for educators to avoid harming their students. Like corporate 
managers, the conduct of managers in education is highly regulated, but 
the regulation is not sufficient to help students avoid serious harm 
caused by educators' egregious conduct, nor does it provide recovery for 
students who have suffered such harm. 
There is an important and fundamental dissimilarity between 
accountability in the corporate context and potential accountability in the 
education context. Accountability of corporate management through 
shareholder derivative litigation is possible only because courts have 
provided this equitable relief to shareholders who, without this judicial 
intervention, would lack standing to bring these types of actions. 
Shareholders lack standing in the derivative litigation context because 
they have not suffered a direct harm. Their injury derives from harm to 
the corporation. 88 This absence of standing was the source of sharehold-
at 547-48. 
87. See id. Recourse to derivative litigation, however, is far from a perfect 
solution. First, there is always the threat of the remedy's abuse by shareholders seeking 
an undeserved settlement, although procedural constraints exist to discourage this type 
of frivolous litigation. EDWARD BRODSKY & M. PATRICIA ADAMSKI, LAW OF 
CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS: RIGHTS, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES § 9:01, at 2 
(1984). Second, derivative litigation can be costly, "time consuming and disruptive." 
Id. at 3. Finally, some argue that derivative litigation fails to deter breaches of fiduciary 
duties by corporate directors. "Cases hardly ever go to trial. Settlements typically 
amount to only a small fraction of the claimed damages, and most of the money goes 
to the corporation's treasury." Kenneth Jost, New York May Limit Stockholder Suits, 
A.B.A. J., Mar. 1994, at 24. The value of derivative litigation, however, continues to 
be recognized. "'The remedy assists lawyers in telling their clients that this is the sort 
of action that can subject you to litigation . . . . That can have a great impact on the 
way corporate decisions are made."' Id. (quoting statement of Jill Fisch, Professor, 
Fordham Law School). 
88. Shareholders bring action for direct harm suffered in representative, as opposed 
to derivative, suits. 
[I]f the gravamen of the complaint is injury to the corporation the suit is 
derivative, but 'if the injury is one to the plaintiff as a stockholder and to him 
individually and not to the corporation,' the suit is individual in nature and 
may take the form of a representative class action. 
Eisenberg v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 451 F.2d 267, 269 (2d Cir. 1971) (quoting 13 
FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5911 (1970)). The distinction between 
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er powerlessness in the face of management's misconduct. The judiciary 
empowered shareholders despite their lack of standing for several 
reasons: They were empowered for their own protection and also to 
encourage investment by fostering shareholder confidence, thereby 
strengthening the economy by assisting business in general, and 
corporate investment specifically. 89 
In the education setting, students are similarly powerless to invoke 
judicial review of educators' misconduct even though the harm they 
suffer is direct, and the standing requirement would be indisputably 
satisfied. This dissimilarity in judicial approaches illustrates an 
important contrast. The judiciary enabled shareholders to protect 
themselves because it viewed the shareholders' interests, even though 
derivative, worthy of protection. The judiciary perceived the conduct of 
management and the derivative harm suffered by shareholders to be 
severe enough to warrant judicial intervention-intervention consisting 
primarily of radical revisions to long-standing legal principles in that 
standing was granted to a class that had suffered no direct harm. There 
is no justification for the absence of similar judicial intervention when 
an educator's grossly negligent conduct results in severe, direct harm to, 
students. As in the corporate setting, liability will not only protect the 
student, it will improve society by improving school systems. 
Accountability for educators has ramifications that extend far beyond the 
obvious.90 
One reason for judicial refusal to empower students as shareholders 
have been empowered is that while the judiciary recognizes a duty owed 
representative and derivative suits is important in the corporate context because plaintiffs 
must tender funds as security for the corporation's reasonable expenses, including 
attorney's fees, before a derivative suit can be brought. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW 
§ 627 (McKinney 1986). 
In the educational tort context there is no analogue to derivative actions because the 
harm suffered at the hands of tortious educators is direct and not derivative. Consider-
ation of the history and background of derivative litigation is important in the 
educational tort context, however, because shareholders, before courts granted such 
equitable relief, were similarly situated to students in their powerlessness to obtain 
redress. 
89. See generally Cancun Adventure Tours, Inc. v. Underwater Designer Co., 862 
F.2d 1044, 1047 (4th Cir. 1988) (Limited liability for shareholders "encourages business 
investment and fosters stability in commercial transactions."). Empowering investors 
strengthens the United States economy by encouraging participation in capital markets. 
See Michael R. Dreeben, Insider Trading and Intangible Rights: The Redefinition of the 
Mail Fraud Statute, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 181, 209-10 (1988). 
90. Educators' accountability for grossly negligent and intentionally harmful 
conduct will serve the deterrence goal of tort law and will inevitably result in fewer 
government expenditures for welfare, prisons, unemployment, crime and other symptoms 
of a malady sustained by a society that tolerates educators' negligence which erodes the 
public school system. 
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from corporate management to shareholders, all courts, with one 
exception,91 have refused to recognize a duty owed by educators to 
their students. The duty of corporate directors and officers arises from 
their status as fiduciaries. Educators should be similarly regarded as 
:fiduciaries. Like corporate fiduciaries, obligations of trust and responsi-
bility are imposed upon educators.92 For example, one source of these 
obligations for educators is the doctrine of in loco parentis.93 
Once courts recognize a duty owed from educators to their students,94 
the application of certain analytical concepts of corporate law to the 
educational malpractice context will assist in preventing some anticipated 
administrative problems. The initial step of a student who has been 
severely injured by the grossly negligent conduct of an educator should 
be to exhaust all administrative remedies available.95 If administrative 
remedies are insufficient, as they often are, the student's next 
step - before initiating litigation-should be to demand that the negligent 
educator, or those who supervise the educator, take action to rectify the 
condition that is the presumed source of the student's harm.96 The 
91. B.M. v. State, 200 Mont 58,649 P.2d 425 (1982), is the exception. See supra 
note 20 and accompanying text. 
92. A fiduciary is "[a] person who stands in a special relation of trust, confidence, 
or responsibility in his obligations to others." AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 488 (William Morris ed., New College ed. 1980). 
93. See infra text accompanying notes 130-33. 
94. The same policy considerations that the judiciary enumerates to support the 
decision that no duty owes from educators to their students could support the opposite 
conclusion when analyzed from another perspective. See infra part IV. 
95. Courts require the exhaustion of any available administrative remedies before 
hearing a case. "Through the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of 
administrative remedies, a court will require that the concerned administrative agency 
be given the opportunity to bring its specialized expertise to bear upon an issue in 
controversy before the court will intervene." John Elson, A Common Law Remedy for 
the Educational Harms Caused by Incompetent Careless Teaching, 73 Nw. U. L. REV. 
641, 669 (1978). 
96. In the context of shareholder derivative litigation, unless excused, demand is 
made on the corporation's board of directors to initiate the relevant action. BRODSKY 
& ADAMSKI, supra note 87, § 9.05, at 18. A shareholder could instead demand that the 
board resolve the issues the stockholder is challenging before initiating a derivative 
action on behalf of the corporation. Barr v. Wackman, 36 N.Y.2d 371, 329 N.E.2d 180, 
368 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1975). After demand is made, the corporate board may initiate the 
derivative suit on behalf of the corporation or take over the suit if already initiated by 
plaintiff. The board also has the option of refusing plaintiffs demand. BRODSKY & 
ADAMSKI, supra note 87, § 9.05, at 19. 
The demand requirement seeks to avoid the wasting of judicial resources by allowing 
for a possible resolution without resorting to litigation. Barr, 36 N.Y.2d at 378, 329 
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demand requirement allows corrective action to be taken by potential 
defendants in order to avoid litigation. Frivolous suits are avoided when 
plaintiff's demand is rightfully refused.97 "The requirement of demand 
... derives from one of the basic principles of corporate control--that 
the management of the corporation is entrusted to its board of directors 
. . . who have primary responsibility for acting in the name of the 
corporation."98 Courts are similarly concerned about infringing upon 
the decision-making domain of educators. The demand requirement in 
the education setting will retain management of the schools in the hands 
of educators.99 
The initial goal of the demand requirement would be to remove the 
student from the harmful situation immediately. 10° For example, in 
cases similar to Hoffman, plaintiff should demand that the remedial steps 
taken on his behalf include removing him from the harmful placement 
N.E.2d at 186, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 505. The requirement also precludes a shareholder's 
interference with "decisions on matters clearly within the directors' discretion" and suits 
brought for personal benefit without regard to any potential benefit to the corporation. 
Id. 
97. A corporate board's refusal of plaintiffs demand to take corrective action or 
initiate litigation is generally the last recourse for plaintiff unless plaintiff can establish 
that the refusal was wrongful. As in the corporate setting, a showing of wrongful refusal 
of demand would allow plaintiff to proceed against egregiously negligent educators. 
Such a showing would require proof that the demand was refused without due 
deliberation or in bad faith. See United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 
244 U.S. 261, 263-64 (1917). 
98. Barr, 36 N.Y.2d at 378, 329 N.E.2d at 185-86, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 504. 
99. In case after case, the judiciary abdicates its responsibility to provide plaintiffs 
a forum in which the egregious conduct of educators is examined because of its desire 
to defer to educators' decisions. These courts insist that educators be the sole arbiters 
of the ways in which schools are operated because the courts lack the authority and 
expertise to do so. Interestingly, there is no such absolute abdication of judicial 
intervention in the corporate context. While courts most often defer to the business 
judgment of corporate management, they do not do so when that judgment was not 
exercised with due care and in good faith. In at least one context, courts will exercise 
their own business judgment when management's business judgment is potentially 
tainted. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). In certain 
instances, a board will appoint a special litigation committee, consisting of board 
members who are not involved in the challenged transaction, to determine whether to 
move to have a derivative suit dismissed. Delaware courts do not defer to such a 
committee's decision to terminate litigation in some instances. The court intervenes 
after concluding that intervention is possible because the court "regularly and 
competently deals with ... scores of similar problems." Id. at 788. Courts "regularly 
and competently" deal with problems similar to that of an educator's negligence. For 
example, courts resolve issues arising from the malpractice of attorneys, architects, 
doctors, and engineers. 
100. When making the demand, the plaintiff may request re-evaluation of a 
misclassification victim. This request is probably made in most misclassification cases, 
but it is too often ignored. Under the proposal in this Article, the request/demand for 
re-testing will carry with it, as it does in the corporate context, the threat of litigation. 
This would mean that the request for re-evaluation would not be easily ignored. 
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in order to alleviate the emotional distress caused by the misclassifica-
tion. The persistence of the student's emotional distress for a significant 
amount of time after corrective action is taken may mean that education-
al negligence is not the cause of the student's harm, and if this is so, 
students and their parents must examine other possible causes of injury. 
If, however, no corrective steps are takeri, students who have been 
severely harmed by the grossly negligent conduct of an educator should 
be allowed to bring an educational malpractice action in instances of 
misclassification. 
The procedure enumerated in the Model Business Corporation Act 
would be helpful in this context. First, as required by the Act, written 
demand will be required in all cases. 101 The universal demand require-
ment "avoids the difficult inquiry and inevitable litigation as to whether 
or not demand was excused."102 Second, students should be permitted 
to bring actions for educational torts a minimum of ninety days after the 
demand was made. The action may be brought earlier if demand is 
refused or if the student would be irreparably harmed while waiting for 
the ninety-day waiting period to expire. 103 
The second concept to be borrowed from the derivative litigation 
context is the use of a special litigation committee. A corporate board 
may, by resolution, appoint a litigation committee to determine whether 
101. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 7.42 (1984). 
102. BRODSKY & ADAMSKI, supra note 87, § 9:07, at 30. 
In the corporate context, plaintiff is not required to demand that a corporate board take 
corrective action or initiate litigation. Demand is excused when the board members are 
so involved in the transaction that they cannot be expected to act independently and in 
good faith, thus making demand futile. Barr, 36 N.Y.2d at 378-79, 329 N.E.2d at 185-
88, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 504-05. Under Delaware law, demand is excused when the plaintiff 
is able to "raise a reasonable doubt as to (i) director disinterest or independence or (ii) 
whether the directors exercised proper business judgment in approving the challenged 
transaction." Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 186 (Del. 1988). 
The notion underlying the determination that demand is futile is that board members 
will resist taking corrective action or bringing a derivative suit against directors or 
officers with whom they work or to whom they owe allegiances. In re Ionosphere 
Clubs, Inc. 17 F.3d 600, 605 (2d Cir. 1994). 
103. According to the official comment for the Model Business Corporation Act, 
the standard for determining irreparable injury is the "same as that governing the entry 
of a preliminary injunction." MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 7.42 cmt. (1984). The 
comment also states that irreparable harm may be established by an impending expiration 
of the statute of limitations, but this depends "on the period of time during which the 
shareholder was aware of the grounds for the proceeding." Id. The same measures for 
irreparable harm may be used in the educational tort context. 
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a derivative action would be in the corporation's best interest. 104 The 
special litigation committee, formed when demand is excused, has 
several options. If plaintiff initiated the derivative action before the 
committee was formed, the committee may recommend that the 
corporation take control of the derivative suit, or the committee may 
recommend that the action be dismissed. If no action has been brought, 
the committee may either recommend initiation of the derivative action 
on behalf of the corporation, or the committee may decide that the 
initiation of the derivative suit is not in the corporation's best inter-
ests.105 Judicial review of a special litigation committee's recommen-
dations varies. It ranges from deference to the committee's decisions as 
long as the committee members are not involved in the challenged 
transaction and follow proper procedure in making the decision, to 
reaching the decision regarding the derivative suit independently from 
and with little deference to the committee's recommendations.106 
Since written demand would serve as notice of potential litigation, 
educators should be able to avail themselves of the option of appointing 
104. See DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 141(c) (1973) (giving the boards of Delaware 
corporations the authority to delegate their decision-making power to a committee). 
105. See, e.g., Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981); Auerbach v. 
Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619,393 N.E.2d 994,419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979); Alford v. Shaw, 320 
N.C. 465, 358 S.E.2d 323 (1987). 
106. There are four approaches to judicial review of the special litigation 
committee's recommendations. Some courts will defer to a committee's decision not to 
pursue derivative litigation without exploring the merits of the committee's decision as 
long as the decision was reached in good faith, independently, and as a result of 
deliberative investigation. See Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 
419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979). Other courts follow the Delaware approach, using a two-step 
test for judicial review of a special litigation committee's decisions. Under the first step, 
the corporation bears the burden of establishing to the court's satisfaction that the 
committee's decision was reached in good faith, independently, and after a sufficient 
investigation. The second step requires that the court make an independent judgment 
about whether the derivative suit is in the corporation's best interests. See Zapata Corp. 
v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). The third approach is almost identical to the 
Zapata court's approach, except that the focus is more on the special litigation 
committee's report than on making a completely independent determination regarding 
the derivative litigation. See Alford v. Shaw, 320 N.C. 465, 358 S.E.2d 323 (1987). 
Under the fourth approach, courts will defer to the special litigation committee's decision 
only if the members of the committee were appointed by directors who were not accused 
of misconduct. See Miller v. Register and Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709 
(Iowa 1983). 
Shareholder derivative litigation has resolved some of the problems of shareholder 
powerlessness in the face of management abuse, but one frequently litigated issue, the 
determination of whether demand is required or excused, remains troublesome. This 
problem can be avoided in the educational tort context by making demand universal as 
is required under the Model Business Corporation Act. See supra note 101 and 
accompanying text. 
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a special litigation committee, composed of impartial members,107 to 
consider the student's complaints. The committee's first task would be 
to consider recommending corrective action in order to prevent further 
harm to the student and avoid litigation. The committee would also 
determine whether already existing administrative remedies would best 
serve the student's interests and assess whether such remedies have been 
exhausted. Finally, the committee should consider and make a recom-
mendation concerning the need for compensation. 
The committee's consideration of whether compensation is required 
should be made both when remedial action has been taken and when it 
has not. Even when curative steps are taken, a student may be so 
severely harmed that compensation is the only means to make the 
student whole. Additionally, it may simply be too late for remedial 
steps, and monetary damages would be the only way to begin to resolve 
the student's problems.108 The committee's decisions concerning 
compensation should serve as recommendations, and if monetary 
damages are advised, it will be necessary for a court to make the 
requisite determinations regarding the educator's negligence. 
The function of the special committee in the education context would 
essentially parallel the role fulfilled by corporate boards in the context 
of threatened litigation, but should differ from corporate special litigation 
committees in two fundamental senses. First, the committee in the 
school setting should serve as a locus for mediation among the injured 
student, his or her parents, and the allegedly negligent educators. 
Second, unlike the corporate litigation committee in some jurisdictions, 
the education committee should not have the power to make binding 
recommendations concerning compensation, administrative remedies, 
corrective action, or the potential plaintiff's ability to bring an action 
against negligent tortfeasors. 109 For example, if the committee con-
· 107. Committee members may be selected from groups of educators and parents 
who are not involved in or affected by the challenged behavior. Corporate managers 
and other business people may be willing to serve, in the interest of working toward 
improved education that will produce competent potential employees. 
108. For example, the student may have graduated from the school in which the 
negligence took place, as was the case in Peter W. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified 
Sch. Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 817, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 856 (1976). 
109. In Delaware, for example, when demand is required and properly refused, the 
corporate board can move to dismiss derivative litigation already commenced by a 
disgruntled shareholder. See Zapata, 430 A.2d at 782. The board's conclusion that the 
suit would not be in the best interest of the corporation is in most cases determinative. 
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eludes that an action is warranted, this recommendation should serve 
merely as one component of plaintiff's evidence. The committee's 
conclusion that the action is not warranted may dissuade the student 
from initiating the suit110--thereby conserving judicial time and 
resources---but may not preclude it. 
In considering the committee's substantive recommendations, the 
court, or jury, should exercise its independent judgment and consider 
two aspects of the committee's decision-making process. First, the court 
should ensure the decision was reached by a committee composed of 
completely independent members who were not involved in the dispute 
that led to the threatened litigation. An integral part of this first 
consideration is an examination of how the committee members were 
chosen. Committee members should be chosen through an objective 
process to ensure their disinterestedness in the challenged behavior. 
Second, the court should examine the adequacy of the procedure used by 
the committee in reaching its decision. This examination should include 
a determination of whether the committee's decisions were reached in 
good faith and after adequate deliberation.111 The type of judicial 
review described here does not involve an interference with policy 
determinations but rather a review of the adequacy of the process used 
by the committee in arriving at its conclusion. 
In recognizing and analyzing an educator's duty of care, a duty that 
must be satisfied before immunity is granted, several characteristics 
should be emphasized. First, as in the corporate setting, the articulation 
of the educator's duty of care must retain :flexibility, because the duty 
will depend upon the circumstances and should be "proportioned to the 
occasion."112 Second, educators should be held accountable whenever 
they have notice that their conduct, or a subordinate's conduct, has the 
To properly refuse demand, the decision must have been reached without breach of the 
directors' fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624-25 
(Del. 1984). 
110. Plaintiff will be discouraged because the committee's decision is to be made 
by independent and disinterested members, thereby enhancing the apparent validity of 
the committee's determination. This is obviously helpful in precluding frivolous 
litigation. 
111. The court's review of the committee's decision-making suggested here 
combines the approaches of the Miller and the Zapata courts in reviewing the decisions 
made by corporate committees. See supra note 106. 
112. Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 5 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (describing the corporate 
fiduciary's duty of care). 
Existing tort law allows for flexibility of the duty of care for all tortfeasors. See infra 
notes 123-24 and accompanying text. 
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potential to inflict severe harm upon a student. 113 This second prong 
would require teachers to observe and monitor their students. They 
would have to act when they observe that a student is exposed to a 
situation that could inflict serious injury. Similarly, supervisors and 
administrators would have to monitor teachers' behavior in order to 
prevent severe harm to a student. When they receive notice that such 
harm could occur, they would be required to intervene. The vigilance 
required should be that required of a reasonable and prudent person 
under similar circumstances. Finally, with respect to this second point, 
teachers, supervisors, and administrators should be allowed to rely upon 
the assurances of others who are qualified to give such assurances, that 
no action need be taken to prevent harm to a student.114 
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS ON WHICH COURTS HAVE BASED THE 
No-DUTY RULE 
At least two courts have recognized that a prima facie case for 
negligence in education can be established.115 One court recognized 
a cause of action for educational malpractice.116 In the other case, 
113. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963). The notice 
requirement is especially crucial in the school setting, considering the density of the 
population of most classes, schools, and school districts. With respect to notice and 
corporate directors, the Allis-Chalmers court wrote, "The very magnitude of the 
enterprise required [the directors] to confine their control to the broad policy decisions" 
instead of monitoring employee activity. Id. at 130. While the Allis-Chalmers court 
found it unnecessary to hold the defendants liable, the court stated that a finding of 
liability would be warranted if the directors had "reposed confidence in an obviously 
untrustworthy employee, . . . refused or neglected cavalierly to perform his duty as a 
director, or . . . ignored either willfully or through inattention obvious danger signs of 
employee wrongdoing." Id. 
District superintendents, principals, and other administrators and supervisors in the 
misclassification cases have in too many instances "reposed confidence" in "obviously 
untrustworthy employees" (a flagrantly negligent teacher, for example), yet they remain 
immune from liability. The defendants in the Hoffman case, for example, "cavalierly" 
refused to perform and negligently ignored the "obvious danger signs" that plaintiff had 
been negligently classified as a retarded student. 
114. In performing her duties, a corporate director may "rely on information, 
opinions, reports or statements . . . presented by" officers or employees of the 
corporation, attorneys, accountants, or a board committee. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW 
§ 717 (McKinney 1994). 
115. See B.M. v. State, 200 Mont. 58, 649 P.2d 425 (1982); Donohue v. Copiague 
Union Free Sch. Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 418 N.Y.W.2d 375 (1979). 
116. See B.M. v. State, 200 Mont. 58, 649 P.2d 425 (1982). 
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Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District, the court conceded 
that plaintiffs' arguments in educational malpractice cases fit within tort 
law principles of negligence. 117The Donohue court correctly analyzed 
the duty element of a negligent instruction case by recognizing that it is 
possible to formulate a standard of care by which to measure an 
educator's conduct. Tacitly recognizing the debate regarding the status 
of educators, the court concluded that if, in fact, teachers are considered 
professionals, the finding of a duty of care owed to their students makes 
sense, especially in light of the imposition of a duty of care owing from 
other professionals, such as "doctors, lawyers, architects, and engineers," 
to those they serve.118 
Reference to two fundamental principles of tort law highlight the 
incongruity of imposing a duty of care on doctors without imposing a 
similar duty on educators. First, in most instances, tort liability is not 
imposed unless the actor is at fault. Comparison of the fault attributable 
to the various parties involved in a controversy is a consistent theme of 
tort law. The fault of the plaintiff is compared. to that of the defendant 
under contributory and comparative negligence principles. Also, when 
a plaintiff's harm is caused by more than one defendant, the fault of 
each defendant is compared, and each· tortfeasor is required to pay his 
or her assigned percentage of the plaintiff's damages under the rules of 
joint and several liability. 
A final example is the comparison of the various types of fault under 
tort law, where the liability depends on the degree of blameworthiness 
of the defendant's conduct. When establishing an intentional tort, the 
elements of proof' are simpler and more straightforward than the 
elements required for proof of negligence. With respect to conduct that 
is not intentional, there are varying degrees of culpability, including 
negligence, gross negligence, and recklessness. The very appellations 
given the various types of conduct invoke a comparison of culpability. 
117. Donohue, 47 N.Y.2d at 444, 391 N.E.2d at 1354, 418 N.Y.W.2d at 377. 
118. Some commentators argue that teachers are not in fact professionals and that 
teaching is a role in which discretion of individual members is limited and which does 
not require the trust or confidence that the work of a doctor or attorney requires. Patrick 
D. Halligan, The Function of Schools, The Status of Teachers, and the Claims of the 
Handicapped: An Inquiry into Special Education Malpractice, 45 Mo. L. REV. 667 
(1980). Others suggest that teaching should be labeled a semi-profession, similar to 
nursing or social work. Frank D. Aquila, Educational Malpractice: A Tort En Ventre, 
39 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 323 (1991). 
Even if one concludes that teachers are not professionals, the fact still remains that 
injuries that occur in "educational malpractice" cases result not only from a teacher's 
misconduct, but also from the negligence of the teacher's supervisors the school's 
principal or the district superintendent or governing board, for example. Clearly those 
who supervise teachers are considered professionals. 
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As the preceding examples illustrate, tort law analysis sometimes 
involves behavior comparison and an evaluation of the blameworthiness 
of an actor's conduct. Comparing the nature and extent of a negligent 
physician's blameworthiness to that of a negligent educator illustrates the 
incongruity of recognizing a duty of care for doctors but not for 
educators. The type of prolonged inattentiveness that is typical in the 
misclassification cases is more reprehensible than the momentary 
inattentiveness that characterizes many of the medical malpractice cases. 
We have all lapsed into the type of fleeting inadvertence that causes 
harm in the medical malpractice cases. Few ofus are allowed to engage 
in the type of prolonged irresponsibility in our professional lives that 
characterizes cases like Hoffman, Donohue and Peter W. 
A comparison of culpability invokes notions of morality. This brings 
us to the second tort law principle that highlights the incongruity of 
imposing a duty of care on doctors without similarly recognizing an 
educator's duty of care. The imposition of tort liability is not based on 
moral fault but depends instead on custom and community expecta-
tion.119 Surely the expectation of the members of our society is that 
educators refrain from the type of egregious behavior typified in 
Hoffman and Peter W. No one can reasonably expect that an actor be 
perpetually and invariably attentive. We all recognize that doctors are 
human, yet they are held liable for the momentary lapses of attention 
that we all inevitably suffer. 120 Since momentary inadvertence is a 
violation of societal custom and expectation that is not to be tolerated, 
it would seem logical that the more egregious violations of social praxis, 
such as those that occur in some of the educational malpractice cases, 
should not be endured. 121 
I 19. Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CAL. 
L. REV. 772 (1985). 
120. This argument is not intended to advocate that doctors should be free from 
accountability for their negligence. 
121. The absence of judicial empathy for educational malpractice victims may 
explain why members of the judiciary are more tolerant of the negligence of educators 
than they are of the negligence of doctors. Because of the socioeconomic status of most 
judicial members, and the availability to them of educational opportunity, neither they 
nor their children are likely be victims of the types of misconduct that occur in cases 
like Hoffman, Donohue, and Peter W. Judges may be more intolerant of medical 
malpractice since it is far more likely that they may be exposed to a physician's 
negligence. 
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In order to bring an action for negligence, plaintiff must plead and 
prove duty, breach, causation, and injury. 122 The first element of the 
prima facie case, determining whether educators owe a duty of care to 
their students, is a :flexible concept. "'[D]uty is not sacrosanct in itself, 
but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy 
which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to 
protection."'123 One of the factors considered by the courts in deter-
mining whether a duty exists is "the workability of a rule of care, 
especially in terms of the parties' relative ability to adopt practical 
ineans of preventing injury."124 One frequently made assertion is that 
a duty of care cannot be imposed on educators because it is impossible 
to formulate a feasible standard of care when a myriad of pedagogical 
approaches exist. 125 In Peter W., the California court compared the 
activity of drivers to that of educators, arguing that divergent educational 
philosophies rendered the articulation of an educator's standard of care 
impossible. The court implied that it is possible to create a standard of 
care for drivers because opinions about driving are not as varied as 
opinions relating to pedagogical approaches. 126 
122. DAN B. DOBBS, TORTS AND COMPENSATION 107 (2d ed. 1993). 
123. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 734, 441 P.2d 912, 916, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 76 
(1968) (quoting w. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS 332-33 (3d ed. 1964)). 
124. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 822, 131 
Cal. Rptr. 854, 859 (1976). It is especially clear in the misclassification cases that the 
educator is most capable of preventing the injury caused by the negligent placement. 
The student relies on the educator's expertise in evaluating his ability and placing him 
in the setting most suitable. The educator is the only party in a position to avoid 
negligent evaluation and placement. 
Id. 
125. Id. 
126. Unlike the activity of the highway or the marketplace, classroom 
methodology affords no readily acceptable standards of care, or cause, or 
injury. The science of pedagogy itself is fraught with different and conflicting 
theories of how or what a child should be taught, and any layman might-and 
commonly does-have his own emphatic views on the subject. 
This is a judicial ignorance argument where judges claim to lack the expertise required 
to evaluate the decisions made by professionals. Another commentator rejects this 
argument: 
[T]he proposition that a judge and jury cannot ultimately determine the legality 
of a particular agency decision because of the difficulty untrained laymen 
would presumably have in understanding the basis of the decision has no 
precedent in the law. Furthermore, the proposition rests on a fundamentally 
unsound premise: that an individual's technical expertise in a given field of 
endeavor in itself qualifies him to safeguard the various ethical, jurisprudential, 
personal, and pragmatic social interests which the law serves. 
Elson, supra note 95, at 669. Judges review complicated and highly technical decision-
making whenever actions for malpractice are brought against doctors, architects, 
accountants, and engineers. The same devices employed to educate the judge and jury 
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This court's comparison of the highway to the classroom, however, 
fails to explain why courts are unable to create a standard of care for 
educators. With respect to the "activity of the highway," there are 
"different and conflicting theories" of how to drive without injuring 
others. In sanctioning negligence on the highway, a standard of care 
does not include specifics about driving, like keeping both hands on the 
steering wheel. A driver can drive with one hand and satisfy the 
reasonable and prudent person standard of care. Other drivers believe 
that the only reasonable and prudent way to drive is with two hands on 
the wheel at all times. Regardless of the nebulousness of the standard 
of care for drivers, however, all drivers readily agree they will have 
breached the standard of care if they drive with no hands on the wheel. 
Similarly, educators are able to readily agree on what should not be done 
with respect to a child's education. The defendants in Hoffman did not 
choose one of the different and conflicting theories of how or what a 
child should be taught. They negligently classified plaintiff as retarded 
and subsequently overlooked visible indications of "normalcy." There 
is no theory of education that recommends that educators ignore 
indications that a child has been negligently evaluated and placed. This 
conduct in the educational context is equivalent to driving with no 
hands. 
While it is true there are numerous approaches to education, it is not 
true that it is impossible to articulate some basic standard of care for 
educators. A flexible but workable standard of care can be formulated, 
as one has been for drivers. In 1993, Congress and the President agreed 
on a voluntary national system of skill standards and certifications for 
public schools. The Educate America Act, 20 U.S.C. section 5801, 
encourages standard-setting regarding the education of teachers and the 
quality of their performance, the student-teacher ratio, student perfor-
mance, the curriculum, and the conditions of school buildings and 
equipment used by students.127 Even though the standards are volun-
tary, the law demonstrates that basic minimum standards of care in 
education can be articulated. 
in these cases may be employed in an action for educational malpractice. 
127. S. REP. No. 103-85, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3 (1993). 
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Courts also refer to a form of Learned Hand risk-utility analysis in 
determining whether a duty exists.128 Under this type of analysis, 
when the social utility of an actor's conduct outweighs the risks of her 
conduct, no duty of care will be imposed on the actor. Without 
explicitly saying so, the courts in the educational malpractice cases 
conclude that the social utility of the defendant educators' conduct 
outweighs the risks inherent in their conduct. This conclusion, however, 
requires a characterization of school district conduct that is overly broad. 
The defendants' conduct could be described as an attempt to educate the 
plaintiff. Seen in this way, one can argue that the social utility of 
education, even education attempted and failed, outweighs the risks 
involved. When, however, defendants' conduct is properly described, a 
more accurate assessment of the social utility of an educator's behavior 
can be made. The risks inherent in negligently evaluating and placing 
a child, and allowing the misclassification to continue even after 
observing indications that a severely harmful error has been committed, 
are tremendous. This is conduct that has no social utility. 
"[T]he kind of person with whom the actor is dealing" is another 
factor to consider in determining the existence of a duty of care. 129 In 
considering "the kind of person with whom" educators deal, it is helpful 
to consider the principle of in loco parentis under which parental 
authority is delegated to public school officials. 130 The in loco 
parentis doctrine "supersedes the usual rule that members of the general 
public do not have a general duty to come to the aid of a person in dan-
ger. "131 The duty under this doctrine has been imposed upon educators 
only in cases of physical injury to students. The recognition of a duty 
in such instances, however, is illuminative of "the kind of person with 
whom the actor is dealing." The doctrine of in loco parentis embodies 
the public policy determination that because the actor in this context 
deals with a child, a duty will be recognized where it ordinarily would 
not, since the child is unable to avoid injury without the help of the 
128. Learned Hand described the negligence determination as consisting of three 
variables: the probability of the injury occurring (P), the gravity of the resulting injury 
(L), and the burden of adequate precautions (B). Hand postulated that if the burden of 
adequate precautions is less than the gravity of the injury, discounted by the probability 
of the injury occurring (B<P*L), then a duty has been breached. If the cost of 
prevention is greater than the gravity of the injury, discounted by the probability of 
occurrence (B>P*L), then no duty has been breached. This risk-utility analysis is used 
by courts to determine whether an actor breached a duty of care to take adequate 
precautions. United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). 
129. Peter W., 60 Cal. App. 3d at 818, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 856. 
130. Donald L. Beci, School Violence: Protecting Our Children and the Fourth 
Amendment, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 817,823 (1992). 
131. Id. at 817. 
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educator. The doctrine of in loco parentis requires educators to prevent 
the infliction of severe harm on students. This responsibility, if it is to 
have any significance at all, must include a duty to prevent the kind of 
harm suffered by schoolchildren in some of the educational malpractice 
cases. 132 It seems logical that the delegation of authority from parents 
to school officials should not only require educators to prevent physical 
harm to students but must also require educators to refrain from 
inflicting severe mental harm on the students they are charged with 
protecting.133 
An additional factor considered by courts in determining duty is "the 
relative ability of the parties to bear the financial burden of injury."134 
Many of this nation's public schools suffer severe financial hardship.135 
It would be extremely difficult for these financially troubled school 
districts to bear the costs of plaintiff's injury by providing damages. 
The financial difficulties of these schools would be less significant if 
plaintiffs were restricted to seeking injunctive relief, but limiting 
plaintiffs to injunctive relief may be inadequate in some cases. In those 
cases where injunctive relief alone is insufficient, one must remember 
that this particular policy judgment calls for the consideration of the 
parties' relative ability to bear the costs of miseducation. In spite of the 
financial troubles of many school systems, one must compare the burden 
of liability on the school district to the burden on the student. Liability 
may enlarge the school district's financial hardships, but the possibility 
of paying damages may deter future detrimental conduct, so that school 
districts pay out less and less in damages as time goes on. The 
educational malpractice victim who remains uneducated, functionally 
illiterate, and emotionally scarred, however, loses more than money. She 
132. See infra notes 154-63 and accompanying text. 
133. This principle would apply even when the harm to be prevented is mental or 
emotional in nature. See infra text accompanying notes 154-63. 
134. Peter W., 60 Cal. App. 3d at 818, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 859. 
While not a party to an educational malpractice action, society bears an enormous 
financial burden when its members remain uneducated. See supra notes 10-12 and 
accompanying text. 
135. It is very likely that mismanagement of funds is the primary cause of financial 
hardships in some school systems. Custodians; on the average, earn twenty thousand 
dollars more per year than teachers, while school buildings remain in a serious state of 
disrepair. Jodi Mailander, Pay Dilemma Tough Lesson for Teachers, MIAMI HERALD, 
Nov. 22, 1992, at IBR. 
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loses her life. Her ability to earn a living and function in society on 
even the most basic levels is severely hampered. 
One must also consider "the body of statutes and judicial precedents 
which color the parties' relationship" and "the prophylactic effect of a 
rule of liability" in determining whether a duty exists. 136 There is 
much law governing the relationship between a student and her 
educators. But, as this Article indicates, the statutes and common law 
that govern this relationship have proven inadequate in protecting 
schoolchildren. The consideration of "the prophylactic effect of a rule 
of liability" goes to one of the fundamental goals of tort law, the 
deterrence of injury caused by intentional or negligent acts. As in other 
areas of tort law, the goal of a system of potential liability for negligent 
evaluation and classification is to force educators to more carefully 
discharge their responsibilities. Whether such a system would be 
effective, however, is debatable. It has been argued that the imposition 
of liability under the tort system "falls short as a deterrent."137 The 
threat of liability for medical malpractice, for example, may fail to deter 
conduct that results in harm to a patient since injuries inflicted by 
doctors are generally caused by a physician's momentary inadvertence. 
It is unlikely that potential tort liability will deter the inadvertent errors 
that result from this type of transitory inattention. 138 The eventuality 
of deterring harmful behavior implies that the possibility of an actor 
considering the consequences of his conduct is not precluded by the 
ephemeral nature of the actor's negligence. Tort liability is less likely 
to deter harmful conduct when the actor's fault is :fleeting. It is more 
likely to deter behavior that is repetitive, or behavior that occurs after an 
opportunity to deliberate.139 
Unlike medical malpractice cases, the educational malpractice cases do 
not involve instances of momentary inadvertence. The-negligence of 
defendants in misclassification cases like Hoffman persists for a 
136. Peter W., 60 Cal. App. 3d at 822, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 859. 
137. Stephen D. Sugarman, A Restatement of Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1163, 1180 
(1992). 
138. Id. 
139. As one commentator has suggested: 
Negligence is, at bottom, the result of the defendant's inadvertence; the notion 
of assessing damages as a result of harm caused by that conduct works best 
to deter ongoing or repeated incidents of negligence, not merely the single 
inadvertent act of one defendant. In essence, we, as human beings, all act 
unreasonably at times; people can be broadly influenced to take greater care 
in their conduct, but we cannot necessarily expect tort law to shape that 
character in specific instances of negligence. 
Michael A. Mogill, And Justice for Some: Assessing the Need to Recognize the Child's 
Action for Loss of Parental Consortium, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1321, 1390 (1992). 
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significant period of time and is conscious and deliberate. It is more 
likely that an educator's negligence will be deterred because educators 
have time to think about the consequences of their actions. 
"[I]n the case of a public agency defendant, the extent of its powers, 
the role imposed upon it by law and the limitations imposed upon it by 
budget" are additional considerations enumerated by courts in finding a 
duty. 140 The "power" to be exerted with respect to a child's education 
lies with the child's educators. It is power that is shared only with the 
student and his or herparents. Furthermore, while many of this nation's 
school districts are limited by serious financial constraints, a more 
responsible plan for spending school funds may mitigate financial 
hardship in some instances. At any rate, financial difficulties should not 
preclude the accountability of educators for their grossly negligent 
behavior. 
In refusing to recognize a duty of care for educators, courts enunciate 
another policy concern, "the prospect of limitless liability for the same 
injury."141 The problem. of limitless liability can be resolved under 
existing tort law principles that limit liability in other contexts. The 
proximate cause analysis severs liability when the defendant's conduct 
is only remotely connected to the plaintiff's injury; a defendant will not 
be held accountable for every possible consequence of an act. 142 
Additionally, analytical concepts borrowed from corporate law and 
derivative litigation would serve to alleviate the threat of limitless 
liability.143 
The Peter W. court also described a "practical" policy consideration 
in support of its "no-duty" finding. "Few of our institutions, if any, 
have aroused the controversies, or incurred the public dissatisfaction, 
which have attended the operation of the public schools during the last 
few decades."144 The court seemed to conclude that since the school 
140. Peter W., 60 Cal. App. 3d at 822, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 859. 
141. Id. at 823, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 860. 
142. The requirement of proximate causation involves a network of policy 
considerations designed to exert some control over potentially limitless liability. See, 
e.g., Sheehan v. City of New York, 40 N.Y.2d 496,354 N.E.2d 832, 387 N.Y.S.2d 92 
(1976). 
143. See supra notes 94-114 and accompanying text. For example, a special 
litigation committee, formed to consider the merits of a potential action for educational 
malpractice, should undertake the proximate cause analysis that prevents limitless 
liability for tortfeasors. 
I 44. Peter W., 60 Cal. App. 3d at 825, 13 I Cal. Rptr. at 861. 
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system is plagued with so many serious problems, it is best to leave the 
system alone. It would seem, however, that the existence of so many 
problems supports the recognition of a duty owing from educators to 
their students, at least in certain circumstances. Some amount of 
accountability for educators would logically protect students from the 
harmful conduct that provokes some of the controversy and public 
dissatisfaction by making educators more careful. 
Consideration of the evolution of landowner liability cases is also 
helpful in the educational malpractice context.145 In Rowland v. 
Christian, 146 the Supreme Court of California enumerated several 
relevant factors to be considered in determining whether a landowner 
owes a duty of care to those who enter her land, and the extent of that 
duty if it in fact exists. The court listed the following factors: 
[F]oreseeability of hann to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff 
suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct 
and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, 
the policy of preventing future hann, [and] the extent of the burden to the 
145. Traditionally, the nature and extent of a landowner's duty is based upon the 
status of those who enter her land. Entrants are divided into three categories: trespasser, 
licensee (one who enters the land for his own purposes but with the landowner's 
consent), and invitee (one who is invited onto the land and whose entrance confers a 
benefit to the landowner, for example, where the entrance is connected with the 
landowner's business). The landowner owes the highest duty of care to invitees, a lesser 
duty to licensees, and even less to trespassers. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 
2d 108, 113, 443 P.2d 561, 565, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 101 (1968). "It has been suggested 
that the special rules regarding liability of the possessor of land are due to historical 
considerations stemming from the high place which land has traditionally held in English 
and American thought, the dominance and prestige of the landowning class in England 
during the fonnative period of the rules governing the possessor's liability, and the 
heritage of feudalism." Id. at 113, 443 P.2d at 564-65, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100-01. Many 
jurisdictions have to varying extents abolished these categories and apply the common 
law standard that requires the behavior of a reasonable and prudent person in similar 
circumstances. See id. at 114,443 P.2d at 5, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 101; Scurti v. City of New 
York, 40 N.Y.2d 433, 354 N.E.2d 794, 387 N.Y.S.2d 55 (1976). The evolution of the 
categories, however, illustrates the judiciary's ability to regulate the nature of an actor's 
duty of care depending upon certain policy considerations. Specifically, under the 
traditional approach, landowners are granted immunity from liability. They owe no duty 
when the entrant trespasses upon the fand. The immunity decreases, and the duty grows, 
with the status of the entrant. In spite of its overwhelming concern for the protection 
of landowners, the judiciary refrained from creating a blanket immunity for landowners. 
In the context of educational malpractice, however, the judiciary has not demonstrated 
such flexibility. Educators, for policy reasons, are completely immune from liability. 
There is another interesting comparison between the landowner rules and the "no-
duty" approach in the educational malpractice cases. The complete immunity enjoyed 
by landowners is extended only when the entrant onto the land has been deemed to be 
less deserving of protection. Salima v. Scherwood S., Inc., 38 F.3d 929, 931-32 (7th 
Cir. 1994). Educators, however, enjoy complete immunity even though schoolchildren 
who are hanned by an educator's negligence deserve and require protection. 
146. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968). 
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defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise 
care with resulting liability for breach. 147 
The court in Peter W. applied these factors in concluding that the 
defendant educators owed no duty to their student. 148 It is difficult, 
however, to see how the court's analysis of the Rowland factors supports 
its refusal to impose a duty on educators. Especially in the cases where 
egregious conduct causes severe harm, the application of the Rowland 
factors requires the conclusion that an educator's duty of care be 
recognized. The Rowland factors are examined in the paragraphs that 
follow. 
In the negligent misclassification cases, it is both foreseeable and 
certain that plaintiff's cognitive development will be seriously impeded. 
While factors other than the educator's conduct may contribute to 
plaintiff's learning difficulties, the educator's continued failure to address 
the student's problems is inextricably connected to the student's injury. 
The educators who negligently place the student impose upon him an 
injury quite separate from the student's learning disabilities. When the 
negligent placement itself causes mental and emotional harm, there is a 
foreseeable and certain connection to the defendant's conduct uninter-
rupted by the neurological, intellectual, or environmental problems that 
existed before the wrongful placement. 
In those cases where plaintiff can show that the defendant ignored 
visible signs of serious learning difficulties or inappropriate placement, 
the moral blameworthiness of defendant's conduct with, which the 
Rowland court was concerned, is obvious. 
The policy of preventing future harm articulated in Rowland would be 
served by the recognition of a duty, at least in the negligent misclassifi-
cation context, in order to achieve the often articulated societal goal of 
protecting children who are incapable of protecting themselves. 
Finally, the only burden imposed on the defendant is the requirement 
that he perform his job in a non-negligent manner, an obligation imposed 
on virtually everyone in the workplace. The benefits to the community 
include a more educated generation and an allayment of some of the 
troubles that afflict a society besieged by large numbers of illiterate 
citizens. 
147. Id. at 112, 443 P.2d at 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100. 
148. Peter W., 60 Cal. App. 3d at 825, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861. 
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The policy considerations enumerated by the judiciary do not support 
or explain the disallowance, without qualification or exception, of the 
educational malpractice cause of action. The educational malpractice 
decisions are wrong as a matter of policy. This conclusion is reached 
by performing a realistic, conscientious, and logical analysis of all of the 
policy factors articulated by courts in support of their refusal to 
recognize an educator's duty to students. The Court of Appeal in Peter 
W. acknowledged that the concepts underlying the recognition of a duty 
of care are not "immutable."149 And one court has conceded that 
under existing rules, it is possible to find a duty of care owed by 
educators to their students. 150 That court, however, did not go far 
enough. Not only is it possible to find a duty of care in this context, 
existing principles of tort law require the recognition of a duty, at least 
in certain contexts. Professor Alexander Bickel wrote that "in achieving 
integration [in the schools], the task of the law ... was not to punish 
law breakers but to diminish their number."151 Similarly, one of tort 
law's goals is to deter injury by diminishing the number of tortfeasors. 
Tort law principles require the recognition of a duty of care where 
practical. If the remaining elements of negligence can be established, 
the educational malpractice defendants are tortfeasors. Tort law's 
deterrence goal is served, and the number of tortfeasors is reduced, by 
recognizing a duty of care. 152 The judiciary in the educational mal-
practice decisions ignores social reality by adhering to the "no-duty" rule 
and refuses to face the seriousness of the problems in this nation's 
schools and the impact of these problems on our society.153 
149. Id. at 821, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 858. 
The court illustrates the mutative character of the duty concept with the bystander 
injury rule. At one time, a duty of care was not recognized in this context but courts 
now recognize a duty upon plaintiffs showing that the injury was foreseeable. 
150. See Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d 
1352, 418 N.Y.W.2d 375 (1979). 
151. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 251 (1962). 
152. See supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text. 
153. This is not the first time the courts have adhered to anachronistic ideas that 
caused the wrong result. Professor Bell describes the Supreme Court's reluctance to 
intervene during the Great Depression: 
People were starving, and for at least half of the population, the economy held 
little hope of future employment. Even so, the Court rejected several pieces 
of New Deal corrective legislation - including even· some laws favored by 
many business leaders. . . . [T]he Court insisted on venerating grand rules that 
had little to do with the modern context of poverty and misery. 
DERRICK A. BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF 
RACISM 100 (1992). 
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V. DUTY DEPENDS UPON How HARM Is CHARACTERIZED 
Judicial disallowance of a remedy for students harmed by grossly 
negligent educators, without qualification or exception, may be explained 
by the improper characterization of plaintiff's harm. This section 
considers the judiciary's mistaken analysis of the injury in the misclassi-
fication cases. The judiciary has severely misunderstood the nature, and 
has consistently underestimated the extent, of the harm caused by an 
educator's grossly negligent conduct in the misclassification cases. The 
inadequate education resulting from Daniel Hoffman's negligent 
placement is only one small part of the harm he suffered. The gist of 
the plaintiff's harm is the mental and emotional anguish that results 
when a child of"normal" development is labelled as a mentally retarded 
child for over a decade. Daniel Hoffman's injury is easily recognized 
as mental and emotional harm. 
Analysis of the policy considerations in educational malpractice 
claims can only be performed when plaintiff's harm is correctly 
characterized as mental and emotional. 154 Applying the first of the 
Rowland policy factors to the negligent misclassification cases such as 
Hoffman, one must conclude that the injury to plaintiff's mental well-
being is foreseeable and certain. The mental, emotional, and psychologi-
cal suffering of a "normal" child who is negligently classified and placed 
with mentally retarded children is indisputable. Peripherally, plaintiff's 
harm in the misclassification cases involves elements of having been 
poorly educated. The injury is notably similar to the harm in the 
"failure to educate" cases, but in addition, the plaintiff has clearly 
suffered profound mental and emotional injury. The component of 
154. In addition to the policy considerations analyzed above, courts have 
considered two administrative factors in deciding not to recognize educational 
malpractice causes of action: the possibility of "feigned claims" and difficulty in 
proving harm. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 
823, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 860 (1976). The judiciary voiced identical administrative 
concerns when it first considered tort liability for negligent and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. When tort liability for mental .harm was first considered, the fact that 
emotional injury was difficult to prove and easier to contrive than physical harm 
precluded recovery for mental or emotional injury. Eventually; courts recognized that 
these administrative concerns should not preclude the recognition of a duty of care. 
Questions relating to credibility and the sufficiency of plaintiffs proof are rightfully 
resolved by the jury, as they are in other contexts. 
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plaintiff's harm, which is having been badly educated, or not having 
been educated at all, eclipses the real and essential harm suffered by 
plaintiff-the severe emotional injury inflicted upon an educable and 
"normal" child who is labelled retarded. 
The connection between the conduct of the educational malpractice 
defendant and plaintiff's injury, another of the Rowland factors required 
to be present before a duty is imposed, is clarified when the harm is 
correctly characterized as mental or emotional. The connection between 
the placement of a child who is not retarded with those who are and the 
mental and emotional harm that results is inextricable. While there may 
be many factors contributing to plaintiff's learning problems, defendant's 
complete failure to address them causes the emotional harm that results 
when a student is egregiously misclassified. 
When an injury like Daniel Hoffman's is seen as emotional harm, the 
moral reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, an additional Rowland 
factor, is unquestionable. Clearly, our society seeks to protect the 
interests of its children in being free from mental and emotional harm. 
The "consequences to the community," another factor articulated by the 
Rowland court in determining the existence of a duty of care, will be 
clearly favorable when a duty to prevent emotional harm to children is 
recognized. The "extent of the burden to the defendant" of imposing 
such a duty, the final Rowland factor to be considered, is infinitesimal 
when compared to the value to society of recognizing the duty. 
The judiciary's argument that it is impossible to establish causation 
because of the existence of contributors other than the defendant to 
plaintiff's harm155 has even less merit if the harm in educational 
malpractice cases is properly regarded as mental or emotional. Under 
traditional tort law analysis, a defendant's conduct proximately causes 
plaintiff's injury when the harm is foreseeable. 156 In the misclassifica-
155. The Peter W. court wrote: 
Substantial professional authority attests that the achievement of literacy in the 
schools, or its failure, are influenced by a host of factors which affect the pupil 
subjectively, from outside the formal teaching process, and beyond the control 
of its ministers. They may be physical, neurological, emotional, cultural, 
environmental; they may be present but not perceived, recognized but not 
identified. 
Peter W., 60 Cal. App. 3d at 824, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861; see also Hunter v. Board of 
Educ., 292 Md. 481,439 A.2d 582 (1932); Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., 
47 N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 418 N.Y.W.2d 375 (1979); Helm v. Professional 
Children's Sch., 103 Misc. 2d 1053, 431 N.Y.S.2d 246 (1980). This discussion occurs 
in the context of determining whether a duty of care exists, but it is essentially an 
argument that the causation element is lacking. 
156. Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928); Overseas 
Tankship (U.K.), Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng'g Co., Ltd., A.C. 388 (Privy Council 1961). 
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tion cases such as Hoffman, the negligent educator is the sole source of 
plaintiff's mental and emotional injury. Whatever the student's personal 
problems, the severe emotional and psychological harm suffered by 
plaintiffs in cases similar to Hoffinan is directly linked to the negligent 
evaluation and placement. Some of the concern relating to the proof of 
causation is eliminated in the misclassification cases because of the 
difference in the nature of the injury. The problems encountered in 
establishing causation are essentially resolved in the misclassification 
cases because the mental and emotional harm inflicted upon a "normal" 
student forced to spend years in classes for the retarded is clearly 
foreseeable and attributable to the defendant. 
Whether a misclassification plaintiff recovers should depend upon the 
extent of her harm. Some cases have been brought by plaintiffs 
compelled to repeat a grade, or by students not permitted to graduate 
when expected. 157 The allegation in these claims is that the plaintiff 
has been misclassified as someone who does not deserve to graduate or 
be promoted. While these plaintiffs have suffered emotional harm, a 
cause of action should not be allowed because their injury is not severe, 
and the defendant's conduct cannot be described as egregious. If, 
however, an educable student with obvious learning difficulties can show 
that these difficulties were flagrantly ignored by his educators, causing 
him to remain in a severely harmful and negligent placement, as was 
clearly the case in Hoffman, he should be compensated for his emotional 
suffering. 158 
In addition to the need to avoid compensation for harm that is not 
severe, vigilance is required to preclude any attempts by plaintiffs to 
manipulate the definition ascribed to the misclassification cases. If 
157. See, e.g., Brookhart v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 697 F.2d 179 (7th Cir. 
1983); Board of Educ. v. Ambach, 90 A.D.2d 227, 458 N.Y.S.2d 680 (1982), ajf'd, 60 
N.Y.2d 758, 457 N.E.2d 775, 469 N.Y.S.2d 669 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1101 
(1984). In Brookhart and Ambach, the plaintiffs were disabled students whose high 
school diplomas were invalidated due to their inability to pass basic competency tests. 
See also Morgan v. Board of Educ., 22 Ill. App. 3d 241, 317 N.E.2d 393 (1974) (student 
denied promotion to first grade due to inability to pass a readiness test). 
158. In other types of misclassification cases, such as negligent tracking situations 
where students are dumped into special education classes where they do not belong, 
injunctive relief should be the sole remedy. It is likely that these types of cases will be 
more numerous, and monetary compensation will unnecessarily drain the already scarce 
resources of this nation's school systems. The granting of timely injunctive relief will 
insure that the negligent placement is rectified before irreversible emotional harm is 
inflicted as was the case in Hoffman. 
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misclassification is too broadly construed, the distinction between these 
cases and "failure to educate" claims will be meaningless. If the 
judiciary agrees that a duty owed from educators should only be 
recognized in the misclassification context, plaintiffs whose injury 
essentially results from a failure to educate may attempt to recast their 
claims so they will be considered misclassification claims. For this 
reason, if a cause of action is recognized only in the misclassification 
cases, such claims must be narrowly construed and limited to cases of 
affirmative negligence on the educator's part. For example, the 
educator's misfeasance must involve grossly negligent evaluation and 
placement of a student that constitutes more than a mere error in 
judgment. There must be some notice to the educators that the 
classification was negligently made, coupled with a failure on the 
educators' part to rectify the harmful placement. 159 And finally, severe 
mental and emotional injury must result from the educators' negligence. 
The severity of the plaintiff's harm may be inferred from the egregious-
ness of the defendant's conduct, as is done in some intentional infliction 
of emotional distress cases.160 All of these factors were present in the 
Hoffman case where the court nevertheless denied recovery, arguing that 
defendant owed no duty to refrain from this type of egregious conduct 
in order to avoid severe harm to plaintiff. 
Even if courts eventually recognize that plaintiff's injury has been 
improperly characterized, misclassification plaintiffs may still be 
unsuccessful because of judicial reluctance to compensate for harm that 
is purely mental or emotional.161 At one time, courts were reluctant 
159. A parent's expression of concern should be sufficient to serve as notice to 
educators. Educators, however, will be held liable only if the placement involved gross 
negligence. 
160. See State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 
(1952). The nature of the defendant's conduct helps to assure that severe emotional 
harm resulted. "From their own experience jurors are aware of the extent and character 
of the disagreeable emotions that may result from the defendant's conduct .... " Id. at 
338, 240 P.2d at 286. 
161. As is the case in some tort actions for defamation, privacy, assault, false 
imprisonment, and battery, defendant's conduct causes harm to plaintiffs dignity. See, 
e.g., Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990) (defamation); Washington v. 
Harper, 497 U.S. 210 (1990) (assault); Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 
U.S. 261 (1990) (privacy); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985) (battery); Thigpen v. 
United States, 800 F.2d 393, 397 (4th Cir. 1986) (assault and battery). Defendant's 
conduct also injures plaintiff economically in the misclassification and "failure to 
educate" cases. Plaintiffs' economic interests are protected under traditional tort law 
principles in actions brought for defamation, injurious falsehood, and interference with 
contract. See, e.g., Brownsville Golden Age Nursing Home, Inc. v. Wells, 839 F.2d 155 
(3d Cir. 1988); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981). There is 
no reason to deny protection of plaintiffs economic and dignity interests merely because 
the harm is caused by educators. 
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to allow recovery for other than physical injuries. It is now clear, 
however, that tort law principles allow protection of a plaintiff's interest 
in being free from purely emotional and mental harm.162 The judiciary 
has recognized plaintiffs' claims for mental and emotional harm in 
contexts that seem far less meritorious than the situation where severe 
emotional harm is inflicted upon a child. More specifically, defendants 
whose conduct is far less egregious than that of the defendants in 
Hoffman have been held accountable for the mental harm their conduct 
has caused, even when the harm was likely to be far less severe than that 
inflicted upon Daniel Hoffman. 163 The incongruous result of the 
incorrect characterization of plaintiff's harm is that while recognizing an 
educator's duty to protect students from physical harm, the judiciary 
refuses to protect the schoolchild's interest in being free from mental 
harm, even though, in certain circumstances, it provides this protection 
from emotional harm to plaintiffs outside the school setting. 
CONCLUSION 
The question explored in this Article is whether the conduct of the 
defendants in the educational malpractice cases is the type of conduct 
which the judiciary generally examines. One must conclude that it is 
162. See Simon v. Solomon, 385 Mass. 91, 431 N.E.2d 556 (1982); Birkenhead v. 
Coombs, 143 Vt. 167, 465 A.2d 244 (1983). In both cases tenants recovered for 
emotional distress when landlords failed to provide adequate facilities. See also 
Christensen v. Superior Ct., 54 Cal. 3d 868, 820 P.2d 181, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 79 (1991) 
(relatives, who did not themselves contract for burial services, allowed to recover for 
emotional distress when defendant mortuaries sold human organs from the remains of 
the deceased); Miley v. Landry, 582 So. 2d 833 {La. 199!) (plaintiff allowed to recover 
for mental suffering caused by automobile collision). 
Also relevant are actions for negligent infliction of emotional distress where 
bystanders are allowed to recover when they observe or perceive physical injury to a 
close relative. See Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814,257 Cal. Rptr. 865 
(1989); Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). 
163. See, e.g., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 
Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980) (recognizing plaintiff's claim for emotional distress against a 
doctor who erroneously told his wife that she had contracted syphilis); Gilper v. 
Kiamesha Concord, Inc., 302 A.2d 740 (D.C. 1973) (plaintiff's claim of emotional 
distress when she bit into and spat out a cockroach that was in a salad at defendant's 
place of business is a jury question even though there was no physical harm); Battalla 
v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729,219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961) (recognizing a child's 
claim for emotional distress when defendant's employee at a ski center failed to secure 
the belt in a chair lift). 
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and that the judiciary should intervene in educators' decisions, at least 
in the misclassification cases. 
Plans for improved pedagogical approaches will be helpful only if 
educators are held accountable for their grossly negligent acts and 
omissions. A special state commission appointed by the governor of 
New York issued a report that lamented the "lack of accountability for 
school performance."164 When an educator's conduct is grossly 
negligent and plaintiff's injury severe, courts should recognize a cause 
of action for educational malpractice, at least in the misclassification 
cases. The judiciary has failed to intervene because it wants to leave 
pedagogical policy determinations to education specialists. The judiciary 
claims an inability to adjudge pedagogical policy determinations. Courts 
are equally vigilant about protecting the policy-making powers of 
corporate managers, 165 yet the decisions of directors and officers are 
immune from judicial review only if they have satisfied fiduciary 
obligations. If the decision made by corporate management results from 
self-dealing, bad faith, or gross negligence, courts will intervene. 166 
Similarly, the judiciary should refrain from interfering with decisions 
regarding pedagogical approaches. Educators' policy decisions should 
be completely immune from judicial review. Decisions relating to 
pedagogical procedure, such as curriculum choice, should continue to 
enjoy the full immunity that they now enjoy. Those decisions, however, 
that do not establish or implement policy must be actionable if they are 
grossly negligent or reached in bad faith. 
The common law is on its way to resolving some of the incongruities 
in judicial reaction to the decision-making of educators when compared 
to judicial reaction in other contexts. In Helbig, a principal's decision 
to alter a student's grades in order to improve the school's reputation 
was deemed to have been reached in bad faith. The Helbig plaintiff was 
164. James Dao, Albany Panel Asks Changes For Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Dec . 21, 
1993, at Bl. The governor created a commission composed of educators, business 
people, and politicians to investigate the public schools' budget management after 
discovering that a school superintendent's retirement package was worth almost one 
million dollars. Id. 
165. "[C]ourts of equity will not undertake to control the policy or business methods 
of a corporation, although it may be seen that a wiser policy might be adopted and the 
business more successful if other methods were pursued." Wheeler v. Pullman Iron and 
Steel Co., 143 Ill. 197,208, 32 N.E. 420,423 (1892). It is not for the courts to "resolve 
for corporations questions of policy and business management." Davis v. Louisville Gas 
& Elec. Co., 16 Del. Ch. 157, 169, 142 A. 654, 659 (1928). 
166. If, for example, directors are involved in a conflict of interest, they will no 
longer enjoy the presumption granted their decisions under the business judgment rule 
and will bear the burden of proof as to the fairness and reasonableness of the challenged 
transaction. Lewis v. S.L. & E., Inc., 629 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1980). 
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successful because, as with corporate directors, educators are to be held 
accountable for decisions made in bad faith. In the education setting, 
this idea should be extended to decisions that result from gross 
negligence, as is done with such decisions made by corporate directors. 
Is improvement of our public schools a judicial task? Yes. In spite 
of extensive action on the part of most state legislatures, many of our 
schools remain severely inadequate. Accountability for educators in 
egregious cases of misclassification would be an important step toward 
improved. school systems. The judiciary has intervened to make the 
world safer for shareholders by arming them with derivative litiga-
tion. 167 It has done the same for the malpractice victims of other 
professionals. 168 Under the proposal made in this article, the courts 
would be used sparingly. Adoption of certain corporate law principles 
in the school setting will enhance educator accountability and will allow 
for the opportunity to take corrective action before an action is ever 
filed. Potential tort liability in the most egregious misclassification 
cases will prevent harm. 
The recognition of an action for malpractice in the misclassification 
cases would expand tort law's reach when many advocate that tort law 
liability be limited.169 This expansion is justified in the most severe 
misclassification cases. The educators' conduct in these cases involves 
more than the momentary inadvertence that is typical in many negligence 
cases. The misclassification defendants have time to think about 
potential liability and change their behavior. The driver who accelerates 
rather than brakes in a careless and fleeting moment does not. Potential 
liability is likely to deter the harmful conduct of educators who 
misclassify and fail to rectify their error. These cases are much more 
likely to serve tort law's deterrence goal than cases where the actor is 
culpable only of momentrur lapses of attention. 
The genius of our common law has been its capacity for growth and its 
adaptability to the needs of the times. Generally courts have accomplished the 
desired result indirectly through the molding of old forms. Occasionally they 
167. See supra text accompanying notes 85-87. 
168. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text. 
169. Two examples are proposals to limit punitive damages in negligence actions 
and recoveries for the victims of medical malpractice. See Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 
223 (1989) {limiting tuition reimbursement); Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 
883 (1984) (limiting a related service under the Education of the Handicapped Act); 
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (limiting damages in biased school setting). 
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have done it directly through frank rejection of the old and recognition of the 
new. But whichever path the common law has taken, it has not been found 
wanting as the proper tool for the advancement of the general good. 170 
Judge Jacobs would be disappointed in the lack of genius of the 
common law as it relates to educational malpractice. In the context of 
the negligent performance of educators' tasks, it has failed to take the 
path that would most advance the general good. 
170. A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 145, 154, 98 A.2d 581, 586 (1953) 
(Jacobs, J.). 
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